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IDEOLOGICAL RENEWAL AND NOSTALGIA  
IN CHINA’S “AVANT-GARDE”  
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
SAMULI SEPPÄNEN∗ 
ABSTRACT 
This Article examines certain attempts in Chinese legal scholarship to 
formulate alternatives to “Western” or “liberal” rule of law ideology. The 
Article discusses three different strands of contemporary Chinese “avant-
garde” legal scholarship: (i) neo-conservative critical scholarship, which 
builds on American legal realism, critical legal studies, and critical social 
theory; (ii) a form of New Confucian virtue-based legal thought, which 
combines traditionalist Chinese ethics with Western virtue ethics; and (iii) 
certain communitarian rule of law theories. The Article identifies a 
paradox in the premise of Chinese avant-garde scholars’ ideological 
renewal project: avant-garde scholars can only hope to create illusions of 
ideological change, often through nostalgic arguments, lest their 
proposals appear too unrealistic or outlandish. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the early 1990s, elite Chinese law schools have been torn by 
ideological divisions. The fiercest debates have been conducted between 
“liberal” law professors, who support the Westernization of China’s 
judicial and political system, and their “neo-conservative,” “New Leftist,” 
and “New Confucian” opponents. The former group of scholars 
emphasizes liberal values, such as individual freedoms and equal concern 
and respect for all; the latter group sets out to formulate new alternatives 
to both socialism and what they define as “Western” or “liberal” rule of 
law ideology, thus forming the scholarly “avant-garde” of Chinese legal 
academia. To be sure, avant-garde scholarship accounts for only a small 
fraction of Chinese legal scholarship, most of which can be broadly 
described as “legal dogmatics” or “legal hermeneutics.” As is the case in 
continental Europe (but not so much in the United States), mainstream 
legal scholarship in China analyzes and systemizes legal norms and aims 
to be of immediate use to the practitioners of law. But while only a 
handful of Chinese legal scholars work on avant-garde projects, these 
scholars play a significant role in Chinese legal academia. For better or for 
worse, Chinese avant-garde scholars have been able to cast doubt on the 
universally beneficial nature of liberal legal thought.1  
 
 
 1. For an introduction to Chinese intellectual debates, see Deng Zhenglai, Academic Inquiries 
into the Chinese “Success Story,” in STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY: THE CHINESE PERSPECTIVE 1 (Deng 
Zhenglai ed., 2011); JOSEPH FEWSMITH, CHINA SINCE TIANANMEN: THE POLITICS OF TRANSITION (1st 
ed. 2001); MERLE GOLDMAN, FROM COMRADE TO CITIZEN: THE STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL RIGHTS IN 
CHINA (2005); PETER R. MOODY, CONSERVATIVE THOUGHT IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA (2007); Wang 
Chaohua, Introduction, in ONE CHINA, MANY PATHS 9 (Wang Chaohua ed., 2003). For ideological 
debates within Chinese legal academia, see DENG ZHENGLAI, ZHONGGUO FAXUE XIANG HE CHU QU 
[WHITHER CHINESE LAW] (2008); RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF 
LAW (2002); Randall Peerenboom, Let One Hundred Flowers Bloom, One Hundred Schools Contend: 
Debating Rule of Law in China, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 471 (2002); Shen Yuanyuan, Conceptions and 
Receptions of Legality: Understanding the Complexity of Law Reform in Modern China, in THE 
LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 20 (Karen G. Turner et al. eds., 2000). For a critical description 
of mainstream legal methods in Chinese legal academia, see Zhu Suli, Yexu Zhengzai Fasheng: 
Zhongguo Dangdai Faxue Fazhan de Yige Gailan [Possible Developments—An Outlook of the 
Development of Contemporary Jurisprudence of China], BIJIAOFA YANJIU [COMPARATIVE LAW] 1 
(Mar. 2001), available at http://article.chinalawinfo.com/Article_Detail.asp?ArticleID=26048. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss1/7
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Compared to the study of Chinese society and politics, Chinese legal 
theory, including its avant-garde strand, has received little attention 
outside China.2 One reason for this may be the well-justified suspicion that 
Chinese legal scholarship is compromised by ideological constraints 
imposed by China’s authoritarian state. There may also be an assumption 
that Chinese law—and, by extension, Chinese legal theory—is sub-
standard in comparison to its American and European models.3 Even in 
China, there is much skepticism about the intellectual integrity of Chinese 
legal scholars. A common observation among Chinese scholars is that 
what Chinese academics write and what they think are two different 
things. Some prominent scholars are thought to be motivated by careerist 
objectives, while others acknowledge that they cannot state publicly what 
they actually think about the rule of law in China.4  
This Article seeks to demonstrate that the critical analysis of Chinese 
avant-garde scholarship provides not only an interesting window to inter-
elite rivalry in contemporary China, but also an opportunity to examine 
certain background assumptions of contemporary development studies. 
Today, few development theorists adhere to the stage theories of the 1950s 
and 1960s, which postulated a universally valid development path.5  The 
new global “common sense” on development planning is based on the 
search for context specificity.6 Development studies as a discipline finds 
itself in a “Post Moment,” in which “big ideas and grand solutions have 
been abandoned.”7 Instead of providing universal solutions, contemporary 
 
 
 2. Probably the best-known Chinese legal theorist in the West is Professor Zhu Suli. See Frank 
Upham, Who Will Find the Defendant if He Stays with His Sheep? Justice in Rural China, 114 YALE 
L.J. 1675 (2005). For foreign-published research on Chinese legal theory, see Albert Y. Chen, Toward 
a Legal Enlightenment: Discussions in Contemporary China on the Rule of Law, 17 UCLA PAC. 
BASIN L.J. 125 (2000); Peerenboom, Let One Hundred Flowers Bloom, supra note 1; Yu Xingzhong, 
Legal Pragmatism in the People’s Republic of China, 3 J. CHINESE L. 29 (1989); Yu Xingzhong, 
Western Constitutional Ideas and Constitutional Discourse in China, 1978–2005, in BUILDING 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA 111 (Stéphanie Balme & Michael W. Dowdle eds., 2009) 
 3. See Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 179 (2002). 
 4. For obvious reasons textual references for such statements are hard to find. See, however, 
infra note 202. 
 5. For a prominent example, see WALT WHITMAN ROSTOW, THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC 
GROWTH: A NON-COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (3d ed. 1990). 
 6. See David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos, Introduction: The Third Moment in Law and 
Development Theory and the Emergence of New Critical Practice, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 1, 13–14 (David Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006); David 
Kennedy, Laws and Developments, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: FACING COMPLEXITY IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 17 (John Hatchard & Amanda Perry-Kessaris eds., 2003); David Kennedy, The “Rule of 
Law,” Political Choices, and Development Common Sense, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra, at 95. 
 7. See Scott Newton, Law and Development, Law and Economics and The Fate of Legal 
Technical Assistance, in LAWMAKING FOR DEVELOPMENT: EXPLORATIONS INTO THE THEORY AND 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
86 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 13:83 
 
 
 
 
development studies emphasize that answers to development questions 
emerge from “a recognition of the contextual nature of policy solutions.”8 
“Gone is the confidence [of development scholars] that they have the 
correct recipe, or that privatization, stabilization, and liberalization can be 
implemented in similar ways in different parts of the world.”9 Extended to 
the field of law and development, the new common sense of development 
studies stresses the contextual nature of legal institutions and calls into 
question the supposed benefits of rule of law advocacy.10 Parallel to these 
developments, the so-called semiotic turn in social theory has convinced 
scholars that concepts such as the rule of law are “floating signifiers” (or, 
more colloquially, “empty vessels”), which are open to endless 
redefinitions.11 From this perspective, the components of the rule of law 
(the “independence of the judiciary,” for instance) should take on different 
meanings in the Chinese context or be abandoned all together. To claim 
otherwise would be to adhere to philosophically outmoded “essentialism” 
or deterministic structuralism, both of which see little possibilities for 
social agents to redefine concepts such as the rule of law. 
Building on these trends as well as Western critical theory, part of the 
Chinese avant-garde scholarship criticizes the supposed universalism of 
the liberal rule of law ideology. A central argument of certain avant-garde 
scholars is that, rather than being the cure for China’s social ills, the 
elements of the liberal rule of law have contributed to increasing social 
inequality, corruption, illegality, and other adverse social effects.12 
Another part of the Chinese avant-garde scholarship consists of attempts 
to envision a China-specific legal governance model. A small number of 
Chinese scholars have taken up the challenge of articulating a new kind of 
 
 
PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATIVE PROJECTS 23, 29 (J. Arnscheidt et al. eds., 2008). 
 8. See Dani Rodrik, The New Development Economics: We Shall Experiment, but How Shall 
We Learn?, in WHAT WORKS IN DEVELOPMENT?: THINKING BIG AND THINKING SMALL 24, 25 
(Jessica Cohen & William Easterly eds., 2009). 
 9. Id. at 40. 
 10. See David Kennedy, The “Rule of Law,” supra note 6; and infra notes 36, 37, and 
accompanying text. The new mainstream on law and development holds as a matter of fact that 
“familiar institutions of liberal democracy must be tailored, and supplemented with other measures, in 
order to deal with the often starkly different ethnoeconomic and ethnopolitical conditions of the 
developing world.” Amy L. Chua, The Paradox of Free Market Democracy: Rethinking Development 
Policy 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 287, 362 (2000). 
 11. See Matthew C. Stephenson, A Trojan Horse Behind Chinese Walls? Problems and 
Prospects of U.S.-Sponsored “Rule of Law” Reform Projects in the People’s Republic of China, 18 
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 64, 74–79 (2000); CLAUDE LÉVI-STRAUSS, INTRODUCTION TO THE WORK OF 
MARCEL MAUSS 63 (Felicity Baker trans., 1987). 
 12. See Cui Zhiyuan, Liberal Socialism and the Future of China: A Petty Bourgeoisie Manifesto, 
in THE CHINESE MODEL OF MODERN DEVELOPMENT 157 (Tian Yu Cao ed., 2005); DENG, WHITHER 
CHINESE LAW, supra note 1. For these scholars’ understanding of “liberalism,” see infra Part III.A. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss1/7
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rule of law ideology based on Confucian ethics and communitarian social 
theory.13 
The search for contextual, China-specific legal governance models 
undertaken by Chinese avant-garde scholars is far from being an 
unqualified success. Within Chinese legal academia, avant-garde 
scholarship covers the most intellectually, politically, and emotionally 
charged terrain. While some intellectuals—the avant-garde scholars 
themselves—relate positively to such scholarly projects, Chinese avant-
garde scholars also stand accused of irrelevance, naïveté, or of being 
cynical apologists for an ethically bankrupt regime. From the liberal 
scholars’ perspective, avant-garde scholarship constitutes a precarious 
academic game in which scholars adopt the habitus of a Western “critical 
intellectual” for careerist or otherwise dubious objectives. The avant-garde 
scholars’ skeptical approach to liberal legal institutions especially, such as 
the independence of adjudication and the universality of human rights, has 
been considered a dangerous intellectual practice in China’s present 
political context.14  
Intentionally and inadvertently, Chinese avant-garde scholarship raises 
interesting questions about the prospects of ideological renewal and 
contextual policy setting in China. The most thought-provoking questions 
emerge from the discrepancy between the radical role that the Chinese 
avant-garde scholars have assumed and the actual results of their 
scholarship. The institutional designs promoted by many avant-garde 
scholars are surprisingly nostalgic and conservative, and they arguably fall 
short of the avant-garde scholars’ goals. 
This Article first describes the political and ideological context of 
Chinese avant-garde scholarship. The Article then considers three strands 
of this scholarship: (i) neo-conservative critical scholarship, which builds 
on legal realism, critical legal studies scholarship, and critical social 
theory; (ii) a form of New Confucian virtue-based legal thought, which 
 
 
 13. See Xia Yong, Human Rights and Chinese Tradition, in HUMAN RIGHTS: CHINESE AND 
DUTCH PERSPECTIVES 77 (Peter R. Baehr et al. eds., 1996); XIA YONG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF CIVIL 
RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF CHINA (2011), to which I will be referring in its original Chinese language 
version: XIA YONG, ZHONGGUO MINQUAN ZHEXUE [PHILOSOPHY OF CHINESE CIVIL RIGHTS] (2004) 
[hereinafter XIA YONG, PHILOSOPHY]. For communitarian social theory, see GAO HONGJUN, XIANDAI 
FAZHI DE CHULU [PATH OF THE MODERN RULE OF LAW] (2003). 
 14. For critical assessments of avant-garde scholarship, see JI WEIDONG, Rang Women Lai 
Chongjian Zhengzhi Gongshi [Let Us Build Political Consensus], in XIANZHENG XIN LUN: QUANQIU 
HUA SHIDAI DE FA YU SHEHUI BIANQIAN [NEW CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: LEGAL AND SOCIAL 
CHANGE IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION] 285 (2002); He Weifang, Jiechu Minzhu Renshi Jiang Daxie 
Ci [Acceptance Speech for Democracy Award] (Nov. 15, 2010) (transcript available at 
http://heweifang.blog.caixin.com/archives/13873). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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combines traditionalist Chinese ethics with Western virtue ethics; and 
(iii) certain communitarian rule of law theories, which emerge from the 
critique of liberal political theory.15 The final Part of this Article examines 
explanations for the surprisingly modest outcomes of Chinese avant-garde 
scholarship. The Article points out that innovative work within Chinese 
academia may be impeded by certain institutional constraints, such as 
political taboos. The Article also argues that there is an inbuilt paradox 
within the ideological renewal project of the avant-garde scholars. Avant-
garde scholars can only hope to create illusions of ideological change, 
often through nostalgic arguments, lest their proposals appear too 
unrealistic or outlandish for their audiences.  
II. OUTSIDE THE MAINSTREAM  
Chinese avant-garde scholarship is best seen as an intellectual response 
to the political ideology and development policies of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, which took for granted that China’s development would 
proceed toward a liberal democracy, following the experience of Latin 
American and East Asian countries.16 Legal avant-garde scholarship is part 
of a broader intellectual movement, which includes “post-studies” 
(houxue), “neo-conservatism” (xin baoshou zhuyi), “neo-authoritarianism” 
(xin quanwei zhuyi), “New Confucianism” (xin ruxue), and “New Leftism” 
(xin zuopai).17 The most prominent early promoter of neo-conservative 
 
 
 15. In addition to legal scholars (Xia Yong and Gao Hongjun), the Article discusses the works of 
social theorists (Cui Zhiyuan, Deng Zhenglai, and Wang Hui) who write about the law and who have 
been influential for Chinese legal discourse. To keep the exercise manageable, the Article discusses 
only some of the most interesting and thought provoking avant-garde texts. Some prominent texts have 
been left out because they have been thoroughly discussed in Western scholarship. See infra note 211 
and accompanying text. Moreover, the generation that is considered in this article was prominent in the 
1990s and 2000s—while the academic influence of this generation is undisputed, their avant-gardism 
is already somewhat nostalgic. There is a younger generation growing on Chinese campuses See CHEN 
DUANHONG, ZHIXIANQUAN YU GENBENFA [CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW] 
(2010); JIANG SHIGONG, LIFAZHE DE FALIXUE [LEGAL THEORY FOR LAW-MAKERS] (2007); ZHAO 
XIAOLI, NONGCUN FAZHI XIANZHUANG: LAIZI QINGHUA XUESHENG DE SHIJIAO [LEGAL SYSTEM IN 
CHINA’S RURAL AREA: FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF STUDENTS OF TSINGHUA LAW SCHOOL] (2006). 
Even Christianity influences Chinese legal scholarship. See GERDA WIELANDER, CHRISTIAN VALUES 
IN COMMUNIST CHINA (2013). 
 16. See Wu Jiaxiang, Commenting on Neo-Authoritarianism, SHIJIE JINGJI DAOBAO [WORLD 
ECON. HERALD], January 16, 1989, at 12,  translated in BEIJING SPRING: CONFRONTATION AND 
CONFLICT: THE BASIC DOCUMENTS 130 (Michel Oksenberg et al. eds., 1990); Xiao Gongqin, Wuxu 
Bianfa de Zai Fanxing: Jian Lun Zaoqi Zhengzhi Jijin Zhuyi de Wenhua Genyuan [Reflections on the 
Hundred Days Reform Movement: The Cultural Roots of Early Political Radicalism], ZHANLÜE YU 
GUANLI [STRATEGY & MANAGEMENT] 11 (Apr. 1995). 
 17. These movements have influenced Chinese intellectuals since the late 1980s. See FEWSMITH, 
supra note 1, at 80; MOODY, supra note 1, at 154; Juntao Wang, Reverse Course: Political Neo-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss1/7
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legal thought was Professor Zhu Suli of Peking University, who called for 
a pragmatic, China-specific legal governance ideology.18 Zhu argued that 
Western legal institutions, such as contract law, property law, corporate 
law, tort law, and law on negotiable instruments, had developed naturally 
as a result of trial and error over a long period of time.19 In Zhu’s view, 
China should allow its legal institutions to develop according to its “native 
resources” (bentu ziyuan) and depart from Western institutional models—
such as judicial independence—when necessary.20 Often the native 
resources identified by Zhu were embodied by Communist Party 
institutions, such as village-level Communist Party cadres.21 In the late 
1990s and early 2000s, Chinese legal scholars extended the search for 
such native resources to constitutional law, arguing, for instance, that 
China had a unique “unwritten constitution” that differed from the liberal 
models.22 Also in the 1990s and 2000s, a group of Chinese scholars began 
to seek inspiration for ideological renewal from China’s Confucian 
traditions. These scholars sought to combine elements of liberal political 
thought—in particular individual rights and parliamentary 
representation—with Confucian traditionalist conceptions of social 
harmony.23 In the mid-2000s, the intellectual movements against 
liberalism gained a political expression in increasingly critical attitudes 
toward judicial reforms and in the ascendancy of Bo Xilai, the now-purged 
mayor of Chongqing.24 
 
 
Conservatism and Regime Stability in Post-Tiananmen China 236–37 (2006) (Ph.D. dissertation, 
Columbia University) (on file with author). 
 18. See ZHU SULI, FAZHI JI QI BENTU ZIYUAN [RULE OF LAW AND ITS NATIVE RESOURCES] 21 
(2d ed. 2004). 
 19. Id. at 11. 
 20. See id.; Zhu Suli, Political Parties in China’s Judiciary, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 533, 
556 (2007). See Upham, supra note 2. 
 21. See ZHU SULI, NATIVE RESOURCES, supra note 18, at 17; ZHU SULI, SONG FA XIA XIANG 
[SENDING LAW TO THE COUNTRYSIDE] 48 (2000).  
 22. See Jiang Shigong, Written and Unwritten Constitutions: A New Approach to the Study of 
Constitutional Government in China, 36 MODERN CHINA 12 (2010). 
 23. Professor Jiang Qing is perhaps the most prominent of these scholars. See DANIEL BELL, 
CHINA’S NEW CONFUCIANISM: POLITICS AND EVERYDAY LIFE IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 180 (2008). 
For Professor Jiang’s original work, see JIANG QING, ZHENGZHI RUXUE: DANGDAI RUXUE DE 
ZHUANXIANG, TEZHI YU FAZHAN [POLITICAL CONFUCIANISM: THE TURN, CHARACTERISTICS, AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF CONTEMPORARY CONFUCIANISM] (2003). In law, the most important of these 
scholars is Xia Yong. See XIA YONG, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 13. 
 24. The so-called Chongqing model, promoted by Bo’s supporters, stood for popular (or 
“populist”) large-scale infrastructure projects, clampdown on organized crime, and disregard for legal 
formalities. The neo-conservative political project suffered an abrupt setback in 2012, when Bo Xilai 
was ousted from the Communist Party and influential neo-conservative websites were blocked. See 
Jamil Anderlini, Bo Xilai: Power, Death and Politics, FIN. TIMES (July 20, 2012), http://www.ft.com/ 
cms/s/2/d67b90f0-d140-11e1-8957-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2ivm4FSSS; Chongqing Rolls On: A 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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In this polarized political context, Chinese avant-garde scholars are 
easily grouped together with the leftist wing of the Chinese Communist 
Party (“CCP” or “the Party”) and dismissed as their naïve or cynical 
apologists. Professor He Weifang, for instance, sees New Leftism as “a 
gorgeous and incomprehensible academic discourse,” which endangers 
China’s transformation into a constitutional democracy through its 
glorification of political autocracy.25 It is true that the avant-garde 
scholars’ criticism of the rule of law coincided with, and perhaps 
contributed to, the growing skepticism about the autonomy of the law 
within the Party.26 Since the mid-2000s, conservative factions within the 
Party have mounted a sustained campaign to promote extra-legal 
governance methods and weaken supremacy of the law and the judiciary.27 
At the same time, it would be too simplistic to see avant-garde scholars 
exclusively as apologists of the Party and the central government. 
Changing political winds have possibly alienated some avant-garde 
scholars from the centers of political power.28 Moreover, some avant-garde 
scholars criticize the government’s economic and social policies in a way 
that has set them at odds not only with the reform-minded liberals, but also 
with the centrist and reformist factions of the Party.29 Finally, some avant-
garde scholars have been willing to acknowledge the failures of China’s 
 
 
City’s Deposed Leader Had Tried to Be Different. But Was He?, ECONOMIST (Apr. 28, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21553495; Tania Branigan, China Shuts Down Maoist Website 
Utopia, GUARDIAN (Apr. 6, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/apr/06/china-maoist-
website-utopia. For the rollback on judicial reforms, see Carl F. Minzner, China’s Turn Against Law, 
59 AM. J. COMP. L. 935 (2011). 
 25. See He Weifang, Acceptance Speech, supra note 14. New Leftism was first used as a 
derogatory term by the liberals. Wang Hui prefers to speak of “new criticism” but at present accepts 
the label “New Leftism.” See Wang Hui, The New Criticism, in ONE CHINA, MANY PATHS, supra note 
1, at 55, 61. 
 26. For such skepticism, see Luo Gan, Shenru Kaizhan Shehui Zhuyi Fazhi Linian Jiaoyu: Gieshi 
Jiaqiang Zhengfa Duiwu Sixiang Zhengzhi Jianshe [Bolstering the Teaching of the Socialist Rule of 
Law Concept: Earnestly Strengthening the Political Ideology of the Political and Legal Ranks], QIU 
SHI [SEEK TRUTH] 3 (Dec. 2006). 
 27. See id., a landmark speech by Luo Gan, a former politburo member and one of the principal 
advocates of the “socialist rule of law conception”. For a comment, see Benjamin B. Liebman, China’s 
Courts: Restricted Reform, 8 CHINA Q. SPECIAL ISSUES 66, 74 (2008). 
 28. In the short run this may have been the case with those scholars who associated themselves 
with Bo Xilai. See Cui Zhiyuan’s endorsement of the Chongqing model in Cui Zhiyuan, Chongqing 
Shiyan de San Ge Lilun Shijiao: Qiaozhi, Mide Yu Gelanxi [Three Theoretical Perspectives to the 
Chongqing Experiment: Henry George, James Meade, and Antonio Gramsci], KĀIFÀNG SHÍDÀI 
[OPENING TIMES] 52 (Sept. 2011). For a liberal critique of the Chongqing model, see Tong Zhiwei, 
Fengyu Guohou Kan Chongqing [Chongqing After the Storm], JINGJI GUANCHA BAO [ECON. 
OBSERVER] (Sept. 21, 2012), http://www.eeo.com.cn/2012/1026/235178.shtml.  
 29. See, e.g., WANG HUI, THE END OF THE REVOLUTION: CHINA AND THE LIMITS OF MODERNITY 
59–62 (2011) (criticizing reformist “neo-liberalism” and centrist “developmentalism”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss1/7
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autocratic political system in a way that political opportunists would find 
hard to do.30  
Chinese avant-garde scholars have also gone against the mainstream 
with regards to the broad outlines of ideological development in China. 
Just as the avant-garde scholars have been promoting China-specific legal 
institutions, many of the characteristics that have distinguished Chinese 
legal thought from Western scholarship have become extinct. China’s 
state-sanctioned legal ideology is still based on the promotion of the 
“socialist rule of law principle,”31 but Marxism itself is not a thriving 
theoretical practice in China’s legal academia.32 The occasional references 
to Marxism in Chinese legal scholarship usually appear as boilerplate 
acknowledgements of the need to learn from Marxism-Leninism.33 More 
often than not, these references to Marxism take the form of “vulgar 
materialism”—that is, the conception that the primitive stage of China’s 
socialist economic system necessitates a distinctively market-orientated 
form of the so-called “socialist” rule of law.34  
While the avant-garde scholars are on the wrong side of many political 
and ideological trends in China, the global development discourse has 
approached their position in recent years. Indeed, as Chinese legal scholars 
have abandoned their non-liberal ideological basis, the confidence in the 
universality of liberal rule of law ideology has been declining both in 
 
 
 30. Professor Deng Zhenglai views China’s globalization efforts in a way that conflicts with the 
Party leadership’s economic policies. See DENG ZHENGLAI, SHUI SHI QUANQIU HUA? HE ZHONG FA 
ZHEXUE? KAIFANGXING QUANQIUHUA GUAN YU ZHONGGUO FALU ZHEXUE JIANGOU LUNGANG 
[WHOSE GLOBALIZATION? WHICH LEGAL PHILOSOPHY? OPENING THE CONCEPT OF GLOBALIZATION 
AND OUTLINING A CHINESE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY] (2009). Gao Hongjun criticizes the effects of 
orthodox Marxism on Chinese legal thought in GAO HONGJUN, supra note 13, at 4. Xia Yong, it 
should be noted, is part of the politically correct mainstream. A significant exception to the political 
marginalization of avant-garde scholars is Professor Xia Yong, who served as director of the National 
Administration for Protection of State Secrets, the state agency in charge of internal and international 
secrecy issues, until 2013. As I point out infra Part IV, Xia Yong’s politics are enigmatic and as such 
reflect Chinese intellectuals’ ambivalent attitudes about the law. For Xia Yong’s biography, see Xia 
Yong, CHINA VITAE (Apr. 24, 2013) http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Xia_Yong. 
 31. See POLITICAL AND LEGAL COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, SHEHUI ZHUYI 
FAZHI LINIAN DÚBĚN [THE SOCIALIST RULE OF LAW PRINCIPLE—A READER] (2009) [hereinafter THE 
SOCIALIST RULE OF LAW PRINCIPLE]. 
 32. It is telling that a compilation of articles on the rule of law, published by the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences, discusses the rule of law mainly through the theories of Max Weber, 
Joseph Raz, Lon L. Fuller, Friedrich Hayek, and Jürgen Habermas. See FAZHI YU 21 SHIJI [THE RULE 
OF LAW AND THE 21ST CENTURY] (Xia Yong & Li Lin eds., 2004). 
 33. For one such reference, see Xin Chunying’s statement that law is a reflection of interests and 
needs to be produced by a material mode of production. See Xin Chunying, Fazhi Zai Zhongguo Lishi 
de Mingyun [The Fate of the Rule of Law in Chinese History], in FAZHI YU 21 SHIJI, supra note 32. 
 34. Id.  
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China and in the West.35 China itself has played an important role in the 
erosion of the Western rule of law orthodoxy and the belief, advocated by 
international development agencies such as the World Bank, that the rule 
of law is necessary to establish social stability, attract foreign investment, 
and promote economic growth.36  
III. CRITICAL AVANT-GARDE SCHOLARSHIP 
These political and ideological developments have rendered Chinese 
avant-garde scholarship both more controversial and appealing among 
Chinese intellectuals. The most controversial part of the avant-garde 
scholarship is its critique of the liberal rule of law ideology. This critique 
is more profound than the critique of liberal democracy alone, and is not 
reducible to the support of the rule by law or the socialist rule of law 
principles.37 Instead of Marxism and Maoism, this form of critique is most 
 
 
 35. Thomas Carothers, one of the principal promoters of rule of law advocacy in the 1990s, 
defined the rule of law in 1998 as  
 [A] system in which the laws are public knowledge, are clear in meaning, and apply 
equally to everyone. They enshrine and uphold the political and civil liberties that have 
gained status as universal human rights . . . . The central institutions of the legal system . . . 
are reasonably fair, competent, and efficient. Judges are impartial and independent . . . . [And] 
the government is embedded in a comprehensive legal framework. 
Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 95, 96 (1998). Carothers went on to 
state that the “effects of . . . rule-of-law aid are generally positive, though usually modest.” Id. at 104. 
A few years later Carothers conceded that “the base of knowledge” on which rule of law aid 
practitioners operate “is startlingly thin.” Thomas Carothers, The Problem of Knowledge, in 
PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE 15 (Thomas Carothers ed., 
2006). For a China-based critique of Carothers’s original view, see William P. Alford, Exporting the 
“Pursuit of Happiness,” 113 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1685 (2000). For a seminal critique of Western rule 
of law advocacy, see David M. Trubeck & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some 
Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 
1062. 
 36. For a critique of the rule of law orthodoxy, see Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule of Law 
Orthodoxy 7 (Carnegie Endowment Rule of Law Series, Democracy and the Rule of Law Project 
Working Paper No. 30, 2002). For a target of Upham’s criticism, see WORLD BANK, WORLD 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002: BUILDING INSTITUTIONS FOR MARKETS 131 (2002), available at 
http://econ.worldbank.org/wdr/subpage.php?pr=2391 (stating that the “judicial system plays an 
important role in the development of market economies”). For a position of the rule of law in World 
Bank policies, see Alvaro Santos, The World Bank’s Uses of the “Rule of Law Promise,” in THE NEW 
LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 6, at 253. For the 
relationship between legal institutions and China’s development process, see Donald C. Clarke, 
Economic Development and the Rights Hypothesis: The China Problem, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 89 (2003); 
Frank K. Upham, From Demsetz to Deng: Speculations on the Implications of Chinese Growth for 
Law and Development Theory, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 551 (2009). 
 37. According to Brian Tamanaha, the “rule by law” connotes the use of law as an instrument for 
government action. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW 91 (2004). The socialist rule of law 
principle, as defined by Luo Gan in his keynote speech, stands for “ruling the country according to 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss1/7
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closely related to European critical theory, American legal realism, and the 
Critical Legal Studies (“CLS”) movement, as well as to the global 
critiques of the law and development movement.38 Three interrelated 
elements stand out in this strand of criticism: (i) the suggestion that liberal 
legal institutions are one of the many possible developmental models; 
(ii) the association of the rule of law with (neo-)liberalism and 
modernization theory; and (iii) the characterization of liberal legal thought 
as part of global hegemonic ideological structures, which continue to 
influence Chinese legal thought. 
A. Critique of Liberal Rule of Law Ideology 
The starting point of avant-garde scholarship is the notion that liberal 
rule of law ideology is not an inevitable development model. Professor 
Cui Zhiyuan, a political economist at Tsinghua University, was one of the 
first contemporary proponents of this theory.39 Cui is often cited as an 
example of a CLS-inspired Chinese scholar,40 but his remarks on law seem 
to be more indebted to American legal realism of the early twentieth 
century than to the CLS. A prominent legal theoretical innovation of 
Professor Cui’s economic project is the notion that property rights and 
other legal concepts have no transcendental essences.41 Cui emphasizes 
this point, often made by American legal realists such as Robert L. Hale 
and Felix Cohen, in order to make the argument that there is no single 
correct model of a legal concept, such as “property” or a “corporation,” or 
indeed the “rule of law.”42 Cui, for instance, states that the notion of 
“absolute, unified property rights” needs to be replaced by “a scheme for 
reallocation of the disintegrated elements of property among different 
 
 
law, implementing law for the people, serving the overall situation and following party’s leadership.” 
See Luo Gan, supra note 26, at 5. 
 38. See supra note 36. 
 39. See Wang Chaohua, supra note 1, at 28. 
 40. A likely reason for this is his personal association with Professor Roberto Unger, one of the 
founding fathers of CLS. For citations, see, e.g., Wang Hui, The New Criticism, in ONE CHINA, MANY 
PATHS, supra note 1, at 55, 59; FEWSMITH, supra note 1, at 255 n.78 (noting that CLS is not as 
widespread in China as Cui claims). 
 41. See Cui Zhiyuan, Whither China? The Discourse on Property Rights in the Chinese Reform 
Context, 55 SOC. TEXT 67, 77 (1998) (arguing that property is a “bundle of rights”). 
 42. Cui himself makes the connection to American legal realism, id. at 81 n.34. See also Robert 
Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Noncoercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923); Felix 
Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 811 (1935). 
Like Cui, Cohen disputes the notion that there is a transcendental definition of “corporation”: “Nobody 
has ever seen a corporation. What right have we to believe in corporations if we don’t believe in 
angels?” Cohen, supra, at 811. 
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types of rights holders.”43 Cui insists that it is possible to use “the 
clarification of property rights thesis” for many other purposes than to turn 
state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) into private corporations, for instance, 
to advance labor’s property rights.44 In other words, no legal necessity or 
logic compels the privatization of SOEs in China. Cui has advanced a 
similar argument about land ownership. Since “private property, 
understood as a universal right applying to everyone, cannot exist,”45 
China’s rural landownership system is not only analytically sounder than 
the traditional bourgeois notion of land ownership but also socially more 
valuable because of its attempt to “realize socialized production without 
depriving peasants” of economic and political power.46 
A second element in the Chinese avant-garde critique of the rule of law 
associates the rule of law with neo-liberalism, and more generally, with 
“modernization.” According to Wang Hui, a prominent social theorist and 
historian at Tsinghua University, neo-liberalism “permeates every aspect 
of contemporary society and has enormous ideological coordinative 
capacity.”47 Wang Hui attacks neo-liberalism as a market-fundamentalist 
principle, which is constituted by the belief in the power of free markets at 
the expense of economic planning and social justice.48 Wang insists that 
neo-liberalism “understands development as a narrow problem of 
economic growth and is not concerned with the relationship between this 
growth and political freedom and social security.”49 Wang criticizes the 
way in which the rule of law ideology has been used to legitimize neo-
liberal economic policies, arguing, for instance, that “the ‘reform’ of 
property rights . . . uses the law to depoliticize the property rights 
transfers.”50 Wang places the rule of law and neo-liberalism into the wider 
project of “modernization” arguing that the modernization movement 
perceived the world through dualisms, such as “China/the West, 
quietistic/dynamic civilization, Chinese/Western learning, and 
 
 
 43. See Cui Zhiyuan, supra note 12, at 171–72. 
 44. See Cui Zhiyuan, supra note 41, at 76. 
 45. See Cui Zhiyuan, supra note 12, at 158. 
 46. See id. 
 47. See WANG HUI, supra note 29, at 58. 
 48. Postcolonial critique of neoliberalism associates economic neoliberalism closely with human 
rights and democracy advocacy. See Makau Mutua, What is TWAIL, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 31, 
37–38 (2000); James Thuo Gathii, Neoliberalism, Colonialism and International Governance: 
Decentering the International Law of Governmental Legitimacy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1996, 2001 (2000) 
(reviewing BRAD R. ROTH, GOVERNMENTAL ILLEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1999)). 
 49. See WANG HUI, supra note 29, at 58, 62.  
 50. Id. at 13. 
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spiritual/material civilization.”51 According to this dualistic perception, 
“science, knowledge, reason, and utility” was associated with the West 
and “morality, spirituality, instincts, and aesthetics” with China.52 The new 
“scientific worldview justified attacks on the family system and its ethical 
presuppositions.”53 Whereas social order in pre-modern China was based 
on a plurality of legal norms, local social networks, and status 
considerations, the modern legal system brought about the principle of 
blindness to status.54 This rendered individuals “into atoms of society” and 
separated them from “kinship ties, geographical nexus, and other social 
networks.”55 
A third element in the avant-garde criticism against the liberal rule of 
law ideology consists of the exposition of concealed global hegemonic 
structures which influence Chinese legal thought. These structures are 
thought to support neo-liberalism and the modernization paradigm and 
have unacknowledged negative consequences for China. Deng Zhenglai, a 
prominent advocate of this view, argued in his seminal work, Whither 
Chinese Law, that the reception of Western developmentalism and legal 
thought within China altered Chinese views about societal legitimacy.56 
According to Deng (whose intellectual journey had started with Hayekian 
liberalism), the cultural hegemony of Eurocentric social and legal theory 
constituted a kind of “‘violence’ of legitimacy.”57 Deng pointed out that 
the Eurocentric distinction between “modernity,” characterized by the rule 
of law, and “tradition,” characterized by local knowledge, was 
foundational for modern Chinese legal scholarship.58 Deng also argued 
that Chinese jurists had accepted the fiction of the “universal applicability” 
of Western legal concepts and principles (such as human rights, 
democracy, the rule of law, and constitutionalism) as well as the fictions 
of law’s “neutrality” and “objectivity.”59 
Deng provided the reception of consumer protection legislation as a 
concrete example of the consequences of Western ideological hegemony 
 
 
 51. Id. at 153. 
 52. Id.  
 53. Id. at 141–42. The present Article, to be clear, identifies “aesthetics” with Chinese and 
foreign avant-garde scholars and not with China.   
 54. Id. at 142. 
 55. Id. at 141. 
 56. See DENG, WHITHER CHINESE LAW, supra note 1, at 107–14. 
 57. Id. at 107. Professor Deng taught at Shanghai’s Fudan University until passing away in 2013. 
For an obituary of Deng Zhenglai, see Deng Zhenglai 邓正来, CHINA STORY, http://www.thechina 
story.org/key-intellectual/deng-zhenglai (last visited Aug. 5, 2013). 
 58. Id. at 108–09. 
 59. Id. at 109–10. 
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on Chinese legal thought and society.60 In Deng’s view, legal scholars 
working within the modernization paradigm were primarily concerned 
with legal dogmatic issues rather than with the actual implications of the 
consumer protection legislation. At the same time as consumer protection 
legislation increased steadily in China, so did counterfeit and substandard 
goods.61 Deng argued that the market for counterfeit goods emerged as a 
result of China’s drive for urbanization and mostly benefited urban 
citizens. The negative consequences of counterfeit goods—substandard 
food products and drugs—affected the rural poor disproportionally.62 
Local governments that were supposed to enforce consumer protection 
legislation were unable or unwilling to do so because of local 
protectionism and corruption.63 According to Deng, these developments 
were due to the modernization paradigm and the conception that the 
Western consumer legislation model was a universal characteristic of 
modern societies and thus also applicable to China.64 
As another concrete example of Western ideological hegemony, Deng 
discussed the Sun Zhigang incident, which was one of the landmark cases 
in Chinese rights advocacy in the last decade. Sun Zhigang, a twenty-
seven-year-old unlicensed migrant worker, died in police custody in 2003 
when he was in the process of being deported back to his home county.65 
This caused a public outrage, and the government quickly relaxed its 
practice of detaining and repatriating unlicensed migrant workers.66 In 
contrast to this mainstream narrative of the Sun Zhigang case, Deng 
provided the case as an example of the globalizing notions of legitimacy. 
Whereas the outcome of the case was heralded as a victory for human 
rights, Deng lamented the fact that the Chinese discussion discounted the 
“value of security,” ignoring the possibility that the new practice might 
lead to “social disorder and increasing crime rates.”67 Again, Deng argued 
 
 
 60. Id. at 115–16. 
 61. Id. at 118. 
 62. Id. at 120–22. 
 63. Id. at 122. 
 64. Id. at 129–30. 
 65. See Keith J. Hand, Citizens Engage the Constitution: The Sun Zhigang Incident and 
Constitutional Review Proposals in the People’s Republic of China, in BUILDING 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA, supra note 2, at 221, 226. 
 66. The case also became a constitutional issue when a group of legal scholars argued that the 
regulations enabling the deportation of migrant workers had been issued unconstitutionally by the 
State Council, rather than by the National People’s Congress, which had the exclusive authority to 
restrict people’s fundamental rights. See id. 
 67. See DENG ZHENGLAI, supra note 30, at 218–19. 
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that Western legal conceptions were potentially disruptive for China’s 
local needs. 
B. Aesthetic Experiences Instead of Managerial Needs 
Within Chinese legal academia, critical avant-garde scholarship has 
probably made liberal legal reforms appear less self-evident and inevitable 
than before. The increasing popularity of critical avant-garde scholarship 
has inspired or at least coincided with ideological developments in China’s 
state-sanctioned legal thought. An element in this development has been 
the discrediting of the liberal rule of law model, and in particular, the 
doctrine of the separation of powers that builds on the notion that judicial 
reasoning can and should be independent of the political sphere. The 
CCP’s textbook on the conception of the socialist rule of law argues with 
reference to “Holmes, Cardozo, Pound, Posner, the law and society 
movement and legal pragmatism” that “no country, at no given time, can 
establish a legal code that is able to cover all the social facts and 
processes.”68 The textbook argues that adjudication is a creative activity 
that is based on a number of pragmatic considerations rather than 
dogmatic law application.69 Because of this, adjudication “must emphasize 
politics and the overall situation.”70 The textbook’s message is essentially 
the same as the one made by Professor Zhu Suli in the 1990s: since the 
“legal” mode of reasoning is insufficient for governance purposes, the 
nature of the “overall situation” is ultimately best determined by those in 
charge of the big picture, i.e., the relevant Party authorities.71 
In legal academia, the characterization of liberal legal institutions by 
avant-garde scholars as false necessities was particularly effective in the 
mid-1990s. At this time even neo-conservative Chinese scholars often 
perceived development as a one-way street towards liberal democracy.72 
Their arguments have been less effective against those legal scholars who 
 
 
 68. See THE SOCIALIST RULE OF LAW PRINCIPLE, supra note 31, at 30.  
 69. Id. 
 70. See id. But although the textbook attacks “legal dogmatism,” it includes formalist elements 
when it directs legal and political personnel to “strictly handle matters according to law.” Id. at 109. 
Legal formalism has been seen as a characteristic of legal thought in authoritarian regimes. See Tom 
Ginsburg, Administrative Law and Judicial Control of Agents in Authoritarian Regimes, in RULE BY 
LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 58, 60 (Tom Ginsburg and Tamir 
Moustafa, eds., 2008). 
 71. See ZHU SULI, NATIVE RESOURCES, supra note 18. 
 72. See texts cited supra note 16. 
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support the liberal rule of law notion on the basis of its intrinsic values.73 
From the point of view of this latter group of scholars, the “false 
necessities” argument cuts both ways. While, for instance, Professor Cui 
Zhiyuan argues that it is not necessary to define “property” in the 
bourgeois sense, liberal scholars insist that nothing prevents the Chinese 
from relying on tried and tested legal concepts.74 
To its liberal critics, critical avant-garde scholarship seems nostalgic 
and conservative, because its institutional proposals typically consist of 
extinct or rapidly fading institutions, rather than of new institutional 
models. Professor Cui Zhiyuan, for instance, praises the Chinese 
“shareholding cooperative system” in which shares are “mainly 
collective.”75 Whether such a system contributed positively to China’s 
economic development is open to debate. According to Professor Huang 
Yasheng, shareholding cooperatives were vehicles for the privatization of 
state-owned companies, rather than the means to facilitate their collective 
ownership.76 Cui’s purpose is not, however, to outline a detailed blueprint 
for economic association, but to illustrate the point that Chinese peasant-
workers were right to come up with institutional solutions that diverged 
from Western models. His aim is to generate an emotional experience and 
demonstrate, above all, that it is “possible to break away from the Stalinist 
idea that socialist ownership has only two possible types, namely, state 
ownership and collective ownership.”77 Whether “shareholding 
cooperatives” are the best kind of institution for this project is beside the 
point. 
Similarly, when discussing the Sun Zhigang incident, Professor Deng 
Zhenglai provided arguments in favor of the already abolished “custody 
and repatriation” (shourong qiansong) system in order to make a point 
about the domination of global structures within Chinese jurisprudence. 
Deng suggested implicitly that the practice of custody and repatriation 
served the interests of security better than the present, more relaxed 
residency permit (hukou) controls. At the same time, Deng insisted that he 
was not against improving migrant workers’ human rights per se.78 The 
 
 
 73. See He Weifang, Zhongguo Sifa Guanli Zhidu de Liang Ge Wenti [Two Problems in China’s 
Judicial Administration], ZHONGGUO SHEHUI KEXUE [CHINESE SOC. SCI.] 116, 130 (June 1997) 
(arguing that Chinese values had irrevocably turned toward rule of law and democracy).  
 74. For this argument, see Wang Yi, From Status to Contract, in ONE CHINA, MANY PATHS, 
supra note 1, at 189, 196–97. 
 75. See Cui Zhiyuan, supra note 41, at 75.  
 76. See YASHENG HUANG, CAPITALISM WITH CHINESE CHARACTERISTICS 46, 130–31 (2008). 
 77. See Cui Zhiyuan, supra note 41, at 77. 
 78. See DENG ZHENGLAI, supra note 30, at 219. 
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emphasis in Deng’s scholarship was again on creating a sense of 
institutional possibilities, rather than detailing the content of new 
institutions. 
Professor Wang Hui, finally, applauds rural “new collectivism” 
(essentially institutions such as shareholding cooperatives), through which 
the Chinese peasants “are for the first time moving out of their centuries-
old isolation and rapidly developing rural industries.”79 Despite his 
sweeping critique of mainstream ideology, Wang’s concrete ideological 
propositions, as well as the diagnostic elements of his scholarship, are 
conventional in the Chinese context. Wang supports key features of 
China’s development policy, such as the chastised market economy that is 
tightly controlled by the Party.80 He states that the “free movement of 
labor, public management, and government intervention are all necessary 
conditions for the market system.”81 Rather than rethinking market 
economy, Wang wants to “limit its destruction on the environment, 
traditions, customs, and other aspects of life and values.”82 
To a certain extent, the above-described critical avant-garde 
scholarship is aligned with “leftist” policies—hence the label “New 
Leftism,” which some avant-garde scholars have come to endorse. 
However, for the critical avant-garde scholar, intellectual detachment and 
the subsequent expansion of visionary possibilities takes priority over the 
concrete managerial needs of today’s economy. In this form of 
scholarship, institutions are often an afterthought aimed at evoking an 
experience of limitless possibilities and the assertion of Chinese selfhood. 
This is a striking contrast to the political confidence of both conservative 
socialist and liberal scholars, and, as I suggest in Part VI, a reason to 
believe that critical avant-garde scholarship itself is influenced by the 
hegemonic structures it criticizes.  
IV. NEW CONFUCIAN HYBRIDS  
While New Leftism was the principal counterpoint to 
developmentalism and liberalism in the 1990s, “New Confucianism” 
gained prominence in Chinese academic circles in the 2000s. New 
Confucianism is distinguishable from New Leftism and other neo-
 
 
 79. See WANG HUI, CHINA’S NEW ORDER: SOCIETY, POLITICS, AND ECONOMY IN TRANSITION 
164 (2003). 
 80. WANG HUI, supra note 29, at 41. 
 81. Id. 
 82. WANG HUI, supra note 79, at 4 (emphasis added).  
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conservative intellectual moments by its explicit attempt to derive 
principles of governance from traditional (or traditionalist) Confucian 
concepts.83 It seems natural to assume that a China-specific legal ideology, 
should it ever emerge, will build on Chinese traditions, particularly those 
that are loosely grouped together as “Confucianism.”84 This assumption is, 
however, controversial and easily appropriated for various political 
projects.85 Despite such problems, there have been attempts in mainland 
China to recast socialist legal thought into a New Confucian mold. The 
following focuses on one such attempt by Professor Xia Yong, a well-
known Chinese legal scholar who at present serves as Deputy Director of 
the Legislative Affairs Office of State Council.86 
A. Traditionalist Virtues And the Rule of Law 
Professor Xia Yong is an enigmatic scholar, and as such exemplifies 
the complexities of contemporary Chinese legal scholarship. Xia rejects 
explicitly labels such as “New Leftism,” “neo-conservatism,” 
“communitarianism,” and “post-modernism,” and, in contrast to much 
New Confucian rhetoric, denies assigning the community a privileged 
position vis-à-vis the individual.87 Judging by his texts, Xia can be placed 
somewhere between the liberal and the conservative ends of the Chinese 
scholarly mainstream. Like many Chinese lawyers, Xia is an unwavering 
supporter of the autonomy of the law.88 At the same time, Xia’s theoretical 
ambition—at least before his government assignments—has been to 
formulate a new form of Chinese legal thought that is distinct from both 
 
 
 83. One example of this is Professor Jiang Qing’s proposition for a corporatist legislature, which 
houses Confucian civil society groups, governmental organizations, and descendants of great sages. 
See BELL, supra note 23, at 180.  
 84. The word “Confucianism” was originally invented in Europe in the eighteenth century and 
refers to the teachings of a number of Chinese scholars, as well as to social practices and values. See 
Tu Wei-ming, The Confucian Tradition in Chinese History, in HERITAGE OF CHINA: CONTEMPORARY 
PERSPECTIVES ON CHINESE CIVILIZATION 112 (Paul S. Ropp ed., 1990). 
 85. For instance, during the Cultural Revolution, Confucianism was appropriated for both radical 
leftist and moderate causes. See MERLE GOLDMAN, CHINA’S INTELLECTUALS: ADVISE AND DISSENT 
167 (1981). For contemporary criticism, see infra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 86. See Biography of Xia Yong, CHINA VITAE, http://www.chinavitae.com/biography/Xia_Yong| 
2627 (last visited Oct. 17, 2013). See also LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL P.R. 
CHINA, http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/article/jgzn/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2013). 
 87. See XIA YONG, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 13, at Introduction 11–12, 50. On New 
Confucianism, see Richard Madsen, Confucianism: Ethical Uniformity and Diversity, in THE 
GLOBALIZATION OF ETHICS: RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR PERSPECTIVES 117, 120 (William M. Sullivan 
& Will Kymlicka eds., 2007). 
 88. See Xia Yong, Fazhi Shi Shenme: Yuanyuan, Guijie Yu Jiazhi [What is the Rule of Law? 
Sources, Precepts, and Values], in FAZHI YU 21 SHIJI, supra note 32, at 40, 51–58. 
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liberalism and socialism.89 This theoretical project is so ambivalent—or so 
progressive—that it cannot be easily described as liberal or conservative or 
captured by any other shorthand.  
Professor Xia sees Confucianism as a means to remedy China’s “crisis 
of morality.”90 Xia maintains that this crisis is comparable to (but also 
different from) the crisis of Western moral thought that Alasdair 
MacIntyre identified in his seminal After Virtue.91 MacIntyre famously 
argued that the Western language of morality was in a state of grave 
disorder because it had lost one of its fundamental components: the notion 
of telos, or the “true end” of the development of man.92 The right course of 
action, for MacIntyre, was to return to Aristotelian virtue ethics.93 Instead 
of seeking universally valid ethical norms in vain, people should attempt 
to obtain the goods that are internal to particular human practices.94 In 
Xia’s mind, Confucian virtues can occupy a similar role in reestablishing 
civic mindedness in the presently chaotic Chinese value system.95 
However, instead of the Aristotelian virtues, the Chinese ought to aspire to 
Confucian “morality” (de), “benevolence” (ren), “righteousness” (yi), 
“propriety” (li), “wisdom” (zhi), “fidelity” (xin), “loyalty” (zhong), and 
“kindness and forgiveness” (shu).96 
 
 
 89. For discussion on Xia Yong, see STEPHEN C. ANGLE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE 
THOUGHT: A CROSS-CULTURAL INQUIRY 231–33 (2002); Peerenboom, Let One Hundred Flowers 
Bloom, supra note 1, at 488 (2002).  
 90. See XIA YONG, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 13, at 127. 
 91. See id. 
 92. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 1–3 (3d ed. 2010). 
 93. Id. at 118, 257. 
 94. By “human practices,” MacIntyre meant “any coherent and complex form of socially 
established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are 
realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and 
partially definitive of, that form, of activity.” Id. at 187. Examples of such practices include the game 
of football, farming, architecture and enquiries of physics, chemistry and biology. See id. Western 
virtue ethics, in general, was a response to the perceived failure of law-based and utilitarian 
conceptions of ethics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy provides the following explanation for 
these three approaches to normative ethics:  
 Suppose it is obvious that someone in need should be helped. A utilitarian will point to 
the fact that the consequences of doing so will maximize well-being, a deontologist to the fact 
that, in doing so the agent will be acting in accordance with a moral rule such as ‘Do unto 
others as you would be done by’ and a virtue ethicist to the fact that helping the person would 
be charitable or benevolent.  
Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta 
ed., 2012), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/ethics-virtue/. For a seminal 
article, see G.E.M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, 33 PHIL. 1 (1958). 
 95. See XIA YONG, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 13, at 126–28. 
 96. Id. at 50. 
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Xia Yong’s New Confucianism owes much to Western virtue ethics, 
but it is also distinguishable from them, in particular, in its emphasis on 
the virtue of harmony.97 Defined in contrast to Enlightenment values, New 
Confucianism is “neither secular nor anthropocentric,” but “seeks 
harmony with nature and mutuality with Heaven.”98 In contrast to some 
strands of liberalism,99 New Confucianism prescribes certain specific 
conceptions of the good life, such as filial piety and familial 
relationships.100 The New Confucian perspective is often self-consciously 
holistic: some New Confucians make a point of rejecting the liberal 
distinction between the public and the private.101 Some New Confucians 
also imply a hierarchy of moral goodness that is alien to the liberal 
conception of morality. Contemporary versions of Confucianism have 
largely democratized the concept of the morally superior persons 
(junzi),102 but like MacIntyre’s virtue ethics, still accept the notion that 
experience gives rise to ethical superiority.103 Like MacIntyre, some New 
Confucians also recognize that morality is relational and that it is possible 
to depart from impersonal standards of justice to mark special 
relationships.104 Finally, while New Confucianism typically opposes 
liberal universalism, especially as regards individualistic or “egoistic” 
rights conceptions,105 some of its advocates promote Confucian 
 
 
 97. MacIntyre rejects the notion of earlier Western virtue ethics that virtues must be united. It is 
easy to see how the concept of human practices can give rise to conflicting virtues. See MACINTYRE, 
supra note 92, at 179. 
 98. See Tu Wei-ming, Tasan Lecture 4: Confucian Humanism as a Spiritual Resource for Global 
Ethics (Nov. 2001) (transcript available at http://web.archive.org/web/20090621233833/http://www 
.tuweiming.com/lecture.8.html, accessed by searching for http://tuweiming.com/lecture.8.html in the 
Internet Archive Index). 
 99. In Ronald Dworkin’s view, the genuinely liberal conception of freedom, independence, and 
equality does not presuppose any conceptions of the good life. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF 
PRINCIPLE 191–92 (1985). 
 100. See Joseph Chan, On the Legitimacy of Confucian Constitutionalism, in JIANG QING, A 
CONFUCIAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HOW CHINA’S ANCIENT PAST CAN SHAPE ITS POLITICAL 
FUTURE 99, 102 (Daniel A. Bell & Ruiping Fan eds., Edmund Ryden trans., 2012). 
 101. See Richard Madsen, Confucianism: Ethical Uniformity and Diversity, in THE 
GLOBALIZATION OF ETHICS, supra note 87, at 117, 120. 
 102. Id. at 124. 
 103. Id. at 125. See also Bryan W. Van Norden, Virtue Ethics and Confucianism, in 
COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO CHINESE PHILOSOPHY 99, 114–15 (Bo Mou ed., 2003); XIA YONG, 
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 13, at 70. 
 104. See BELL, supra note 23, at 175–81. 
 105. Xia Yong, for instance, argues for the importance of accounting for the “national conditions 
and character of the people.” Xia Yong, Human Rights, supra note 13, at 87. As I have already pointed 
out, sometimes this argument is made through Confucius’s adage, according to which “a gentleman 
seeks harmony but not conformity.” CONFUCIUS, ANALECTS verse 13.23, translated in SIMON LEYS, 
THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS 64 (1997). For discussion, see also ANGLE, supra note 89, at 233. 
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cosmological universalism—the “Great Harmony” (Datong)—which is 
supposedly based on the interests of all-under-heaven (Tianxia).106 
In the same vein as Western virtue ethicists, but in contrast to critical 
Chinese avant-garde scholars, Xia Yong does not dispute the intrinsic 
value of the rule of law and human rights. Instead, he criticizes those 
Chinese scholars who have accepted the “Orientalist” dogma about 
traditional China “not possessing the spirit of equality, freedom and 
democracy.”107 Xia insists that “rights” (quanli) are not foreign to China, 
even though the modern Chinese language word for “right” did not appear 
in pre-modern Chinese texts.108 Xia argues that under the traditional, pre-
Qin concept of the “people” (min), people were a source of governmental 
legitimacy, and they had, “of course, the right to overthrow a tyranny.”109 
According to Xia, although it is possible to see this right as an ancient 
Chinese “civil right” (minquan), the exercise of this right was obstructed 
by the lack of clear procedural law.110 Xia also disagrees with the notion 
that Western civilization emphasized rights whereas Eastern civilization 
focused on duties. According to Xia, this view is wrongly used to advocate 
“Asian values” and the idea that duties precede rights.111 Xia argues that 
communal duties have existed almost everywhere in the world, including 
the West.112  
The general point of Xia Yong’s nuanced argument is that (pre-Qin 
dynasty) Confucian concepts and Western legal precepts may reinforce 
and transform one another in a positive way.113 His purpose is not to reject 
civil and political rights, and he explicitly states that Chinese civil rights 
should not be conceptualized as “collective rights.”114 Xia resorts to 
traditional authority to argue that the basis of civil rights ought to be the 
dignity, liberty, and equality of the people, rather than the interests of the 
government or the nation.115  In Xia’s view, rights promotion in modern 
China is an outcome of the development of Chinese culture rather than a 
 
 
 106. Xia Yong maintains that human rights build on “Great Harmony.” See XIA YONG, 
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 13, at 150. 
 107. Id. at 45. 
 108. Xia Yong defines a right as an entitlement of one subject against another regarding an 
interest, will, or a claim. Id. at 4. 
 109. Id. at 14. 
 110. Id. at 50.  
 111. Id. chapter 1 at 5. 
 112. Id. at 5–6. 
 113. Id. at 51, 163. 
 114. Id. at 49–50. 
 115. Id. at 51–52. 
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foreign transplant.116 Confucian imagery also enables Xia to frame civil 
rights reforms as an ongoing learning process, in which people gradually 
(and only gradually) learn to defend their freedoms. According to Xia, “we 
can no longer focus on the legitimacy of one right or one ethical or 
political value, but we must make use of Confucian thought and 
complement its weak points, and to strive to develop society’s foundations 
and operable civil law concepts, mechanism and processes.”117 The 
purpose of this project is, “on the one hand, to make civil rights (minquan) 
part of social practices, and on the other hand, to cultivate new attitudes on 
solidarity and social cooperation through the coordination of rights and 
obligations, thus manifesting the people’s nature and raising its virtues 
(de) to change prevailing habits and customs.”118 It is possible that the 
operative term in this mission statement is “operability.” At least to a 
certain extent, Xia seems to be sympathetic to the elitist notion of “the rule 
by virtue” (dezhi) and the idea that people’s ethical capacities determine 
their possibility to take part in public life.119 
B. New Confucianism in Chinese Legal Academia 
As explained above, Xia Yong presents Confucian conceptions as 
desirable virtues, which on the one hand help implement civil rights and 
other elements of the rule of law principle and, on the other hand, redefine 
these concepts. It is easy to see how the first goal can be furthered through 
the New Confucian discourse. The proposition that people were a source 
of legitimacy in ancient China can be used to justify contemporary 
democracy reforms, no matter how ahistorical this idea may be. Similarly, 
contemporary rights claims can be justified through traditionalist 
Confucian virtues, such as “benevolence.”120 It is more difficult to find 
examples of New Confucianism redefining human rights or elements of 
the rule of law ideology. The virtue-based approach to rights may perhaps 
lead to the moderation of rights claims that are based on individual 
interests.121  One may perhaps also argue that the New Confucian concepts 
enable Chinese judges to become more sensitive to people’s traditional 
values (such as, relational ethics) and hence increase law’s social 
 
 
 116. Id. at 95–96. 
 117. Id. at 54. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 69–70, 75–76, 83–84 (according to Xia Yong, people have equal capacity to improve 
their virtue). 
 120. Id. at 137. 
 121. Id. at 78, 128. 
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relevance. However, it is also easy to see how New Confucian ethics, 
while laudable in certain contexts, can clash with values that Chinese 
jurists (including Professor Xia Yong) hold equally laudable, such as 
uniform and impersonal justice.122 Indeed, the very purpose of many legal 
rights, in China and elsewhere, is to protect people from relational ethics. 
As Daniel Bell has noted, Confucian rhetoric about family-like 
relationships between employers and employees has been used to 
undermine employee’s interests.123 Because Xia Yong privileges the 
notion of harmony, he is unwilling to address fundamental contradictions 
between different values within his own legal thought. Instead, he states 
that “from the point of practice, human rights and harmony are not only 
compatible but mutually beneficial.”124  
It can, of course, be argued that value conflicts are characteristically a 
Western or “liberal” concept. Some scholars insist that an ethical theory 
which focuses on the “unity” of values postulates conflicts within and 
between rights and values, whereas an ethical theory that is based on the 
notion of “harmony” sees human rights as harmonious with one another 
and with other values.125 Be that as it may, Xia Yong both promotes social 
harmony and believes that China should build a rule of law system, which 
he explicitly characterizes as being internally contradictory.126 Rather than 
emerging from a coherent, harmonious ideology, the New Confucian 
elements of Xia Yong’s legal thought seem self-consciously speculative. 
In a compilation of articles on jurisprudence published in 2010, Xia Yong 
presents the New Confucian civil rights theory as something that China 
“ought to have,” not something that already exists.127 
This raises the controversial question whether “Confucian” 
adjudication can be realistically made into a flourishing practice in 
contemporary China. In the introduction to his landmark work Native 
Resources, neo-conservative Professor Zhu Suli argues that attempts to 
base contemporary political ideology on Confucian concepts, such as 
“benevolence” (ren) and “kindness and forgiveness” (shu), are ultimately 
 
 
 122. Alasdair MacIntyre makes a similar point in MACINTYRE, supra note 92, at 192. 
 123. See BELL, supra note 23, at 175–81. 
 124. See XIA YONG, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 13, at 160. 
 125. Professor Stephen Angle has argued that Xia Yong’s legal thought ought to be understood in 
the context of the already-mentioned distinction between harmony and unity: “Unity demands 
sameness of thoughts and interests; harmony does not.” ANGLE, supra note 89, at 235. 
 126. Xia Yong, Fazhi Shi Shenme: Yuanyuan, Guijie Yu Jiazhi [What Is the Rule of Law? 
Sources, Precepts, and Values], in FAZHI YU 21 SHIJI, supra note 32, at 65–66. 
 127. Xia Yong, Zhongguo de Min Ben Sixiang [China’s People-Based Ideology], in FALI JIANGYI: 
GUANYU FALÜ DE DAOLI YU XUEWEN (XIA) [LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE: KNOWLEDGE AND 
WISDOM ABOUT THE LAW: VOLUME II] 881 (2010). 
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derived from Western theoretical trends.128 According to Zhu, attempts to 
find Confucian roots for essentially Western concepts are a sign of 
Chinese legal scholars’ “lack of self-confidence.”129 Zhu does not name 
particular scholars, but Xia Yong’s infatuation with human rights and 
Western virtue ethics obviously fits this description. Professor Zhu claims 
that faux traditionalism is a symptom of Chinese legal scholars’ continued 
“Ah Q mentality.”130 Zhu’s remark refers to Lu Xun’s novel, in which the 
protagonist, Ah Q, withdrew to self-deceptive fantasies of spiritual 
victories, instead of coming to terms with his real-life problems.131 Indeed, 
it seems that much of the New Confucian project can be reduced to 
“social” jurisprudence that has been an influential strand of legal thought 
globally since the early twentieth century. Holistic thinking, objections 
against individualism, focus on collective interests, and the conviction that 
one’s own culture is more “social” and “harmonious” than other cultures, 
were once mainstream ideas in legal theory from continental Europe to 
Northern Africa.132 Like social jurists in other countries before him, Xia 
adheres to pragmatism and a materialist conception of reality and urges 
scholars to “seek truth from facts” (shishiqiushi).133 Also Xia’s focus on 
identity and rights is in line with the general patterns of globalization in 
legal thought.134  
From non-sympathetic Chinese liberal scholars’ perspective, Xia 
Yong’s New Confucian legal thought may appear as inconsequential or 
even as an apology for repressive policies. In the former sense, Xia’s 
notion of harmony operates on such a high level of abstraction that he is 
able to explain the individualism and antagonism of Western rights 
conceptions as instances of cosmological harmony.135 In the latter sense, 
 
 
 128. See ZHU SULI, NATIVE RESOURCES, supra note 18, at iii. 
 129. Id. at iv. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See LU XUN, THE TRUE STORY OF AH Q (1990). 
 132. See Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–2000, in THE 
NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 6, at 19, 46–50, 56–58. 
 133. See Xia Yong, Shizilukou Hua Fazhi [The Rule of Law at the Crossroads], BIANYUAN 
SIXIANG [EDGE THINKING] 138, 142 (2008). 
 134. See Kennedy, supra note 132, at 66 (arguing that identity/rights discourse is the lingua franca 
of contemporary legal consciousness). 
 135. See XIA YONG, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 13, at 161. A liberal Chinese scholar may also argue 
that the balancing act between harmony and unity collapses into the familiar liberal contradiction 
between individualism and collectivism. In the New Confucian version of this dichotomy, unpermitted 
limitations of individualism are labeled as requests from “unity,” whereas permitted forms of 
individualism are seen as being compatible with acceptable “harmony.” Mutatis mutandis, unpermitted 
demands for collectivism are seen to arise from “unity,” whereas permitted forms of collectivism are 
seen as being compatible with “harmony.” According to MacIntyre, what is crucial about the 
“supposed opposition between individualism and collectivism . . . is that on which the contending 
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Xia Yong’s New Confucian interventions seem to imply that “Chinese” 
civil rights are not quite the same as those in the West. At least to a certain 
extent, Professor Xia is a value-conservative and a nationalist. Instead of 
being concerned with the moral condition of Tianxia, Xia regrets the lost 
connection between the Chinese people and the Chinese traditional 
morality.136 In a telling quote about the deterioration of the Chinese 
language as a result of Western influence and China’s social upheavals, 
Xia insists that “protecting the purity of language is tantamount to 
protecting the purity of the culture and the dignity of the nation.”137 It is 
equally worrying for Chinese liberals that Xia stresses the negative aspects 
of international human rights advocacy and argues that human rights have 
been used as a pretext, “an excuse or a tool” in international politics.138 
However, at the same time, Xia’s agenda overlaps with that of the Chinese 
liberals in many respects. In the introduction to the Philosophy of Chinese 
Civil Rights, Xia notes that the Chinese human rights thought has been 
“strengthened” as a result of participation by Chinese academics in the 
international human rights dialogue, and China’s accession to international 
human rights treaties.139 Moreover, in contrast to the critical avant-garde 
scholars, Xia argues that Western scholars engaged in criticism of the rule 
of law “watch the scenery standing on the second floor, whereas China has 
not yet completed building the bottom of the rule of law building.”140 
The ultimate implications and possibilities of New Confucian legal 
thought in contemporary China remain, therefore, a heavily contested 
matter. Using Xia Yong’s own terms, it can be argued that Chinese moral 
philosophy has suffered a similar, possibly irrevocable, catastrophe as 
Aristotelian ethics did in the West.141 From this perspective, New 
 
 
parties agree, namely that there are only two alternative modes of social life open to us, one in which 
the free and arbitrary choices of individuals are sovereign and one in which the bureaucracy is 
sovereign, precisely so that it may limit the free and arbitrary choices of individuals.” See 
MACINTYRE, supra note 92, at 35. 
 136. See XIA YONG, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 13, at 127. 
 137. Id. at 18. Such nationalism distinguishes Xia Yong from those New Confucians who 
emphasize the universal aspects of Confucianism. See Tu Weiming, Tasan Lecture #1: The Ecological 
Turn in New Confucian Humanism (Nov. 2001) (transcript available at http://web.archive.org/ 
web/20090105202625/http://www.tuweiming.com/lecture.5.html, accessed by searching for http:// 
tuweiming.com/lecture.5.html in the Internet Archive Index). 
 138. XIA YONG, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 13, at 14. 
 139. Xia Yong mentions his own his participation in the 1993 World Conference on Human 
Rights as part of this process. Id. at 13. 
 140. Xia Yong, supra note 133, at 141. 
 141. An analogous argument was famously put forth by Joseph Levenson in his seminal 
Confucian China and Its Modern Fate. Levenson totalized China into two equilibriums: traditional 
Confucian China and modern China. Between these two equilibriums was a radical epistemological 
break. Levenson argued that the upheavals in twentieth century China created a new intellectual 
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Confucian concepts are no less arbitrary and unjustified in the eyes of 
modern-day Chinese audiences than the conceptions of Western morality 
that have supposedly caused China’s present crisis of morality. Indeed, the 
conception that each society and “era” has its own, sharply distinct form of 
ideology has been popular among Chinese intellectuals at least since the 
1970s.142 Even if this statement is too far-reaching—it is certainly possible 
to argue that Chinese traditions continue to shape Chinese political 
thought143—it may still be the case that New Confucian legal thought is 
unconvincing and inconsequential in the eyes of many Chinese legal 
scholars. 
V. COMMUNITARIAN RULE OF LAW—AN OXYMORON? 
A. From Confucianism to Communitarianism 
As explained above, critical Chinese avant-garde scholars see the 
liberal rule of law ideology as a foreign tradition that has destroyed 
traditional Chinese social networks and value conceptions and, in 
combination with other modern influences, caused a “crisis of values” in 
China. An important line of critique in this form of scholarship situates the 
“subject” promoted by liberal and mainstream rule of law ideology into a 
particular Western-based worldview.144 This argument coincides with, and 
partly emerges from, a form of communitarian critique against Western 
liberalism, which has been promoted by Professor Michael Sandel, among 
others.145 According to Sandel, the problem with communitarianism is not 
“the relative weight of individual and communal claims, but the terms of 
relation between the right and the good.”146 Communitarians do not insist 
on the primacy of communal rights (say group rights), but instead argue 
 
 
language rather than just new words to the Chinese vocabulary. In this new language, Confucianism 
turned from a living tradition to nostalgic traditionalism. See JOSEPH LEVENSON, CONFUCIAN CHINA 
AND ITS MODERN FATE: VOLUME 1: THE PROBLEM OF INTELLECTUAL CONTINUITY 156–57 (1958).  
 142. Xia Yong himself sees morality as part of the “grammar” of society. See XIA YONG, 
PHILOSOPHY, supra note 13, introduction at 12, 127. See also infra note 230. 
 143. Professor Stephen Angle, for instance, argues against both Levenson and MacIntyre that 
Chinese and Western traditions have existed in a dynamic and mutually supportive relationship. 
According to Angle, Chinese human rights concepts “have always drawn importantly on preexisting 
concepts and concerns.” See ANGLE, supra note 89, at 143, 250, 253 (2002). 
 144. See WANG HUI, supra note 29, at 142, 153. 
 145. See Michael J. Sandel, Political Liberalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1766 (1994) 
(reviewing JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993)). For the debate between communitarianism 
and liberalism, see STEPHEN MULHALL & ADAM SWIFT, LIBERALS AND COMMUNITARIANS (1992). 
 146. Sandel, supra note 145, at 1767. In his seminal Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Sandel 
argued that John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice was, in fact, a project of self-discovery of the liberal 
subject. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 131–32 (1982). 
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that the liberal project to establish formal procedural rights to arbitrate the 
selection of social goods must fail.147  
Communitarianism is essentially a project of self-discovery. Xia Yong 
also frames his project as an attempt to answer a question of self-
knowledge.148 However, as explained above, not all Chinese scholars find 
it plausible that pre-Qin Confucian concepts can define contemporary 
Chinese subjectivity. Instead of Confucian traditionalism, a number of 
Chinese legal scholars (who do not necessarily identify themselves as 
“communitarians”) have turned to legal pluralism in order to identify and 
protect a Chinese “self.”149 One goal of this scholarship has been to 
increase the discretionary powers of local communities within the state 
system. Scholars have, for instance, examined traditional Chinese dispute 
resolution and prevention methods and their relevance to modern China.150 
These methods include not only mediation by community leaders and 
other third parties, but also the performance of certain rites (for instance, 
in the formation of marriage), which mobilize the community as witnesses 
and enforcers of the parties’ commitments.151 The argument is that legal 
pluralist perspectives help Chinese legal scholars to reconsider individual 
elements of contemporary rule of law ideology.152 A different question is 
whether communitarian legal thought or legal pluralist perspectives can 
give rise to a comprehensive ideology that could replace liberal legal 
thought. The answer to this question is not obvious, as the following 
analysis of Professor Gao Hongjun’s scholarship seeks to demonstrate. 
 
 
 147. Sandel, supra note 145, at 1767–68. 
 148. See XIA YONG, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 13, at 38. 
 149. A seminal text in this development was Professor Zhu Suli’s 1993 article on legal pluralism, 
in which he described the evasion of formal state law by local communities as potentially rational and 
reasonable. According to Zhu, greater attention to Chinese local customs could help resist harmful, 
Eurocentric rule of law ideals. The article was republished in ZHU SULI, NATIVE RESOURCES, supra 
note 18, at 59. Professor Fan Zhongxin of Hangzhou Normal University has promoted the “sinification 
of the rule of law.” Professor Fan envisions a Chinese legal system, which is tuned to the “national 
character, national manners, and national forms with which people are more familiar, and which can 
better understand the specific problems of the Chinese people.” Fan Zhongxin, Fazhi Zhongguohua de 
Lishi Faxue Jinlu [Legal Historical Approach to the Sinification of the Rule of Law], JIANCHA RIBAO 
[PROCURATORIAL DAILY] (Apr. 14, 2011), http://article.chinalawinfo.com/Article_Detail.asp?Article 
Id=60364. 
 150. See Fan Zhongxin, Jianquan de Jiufen Jiejue Jizhi Jueding Hexie Shehui: Chuantong 
Zhongguo Shehui Zhili Moshi Dui Women de Gishi [The Contribution of Sound Dispute Resolution 
Methods to Harmonious Society: Inspiration from Traditional Chinese Methods of Social Control], 
BEIFANG FAXUE [NORTHERN L.] 138 (2007). 
 151. See Fan Zhongxin, Jiufen Jiejue Shi Hexie Shehui de Di Yi Yaoyi: Guanyu Quan Fangwei 
Jiefen Moshi de Chubu Sikao [Solution of Disputes Is an Essential Goal of Harmonious Society: 
Preliminary Thoughts on a Variety of Dispute Resolution Methods] HUBEI DAXUE XUEBAO [J. HUBEI 
U.] 45 (June 2008). 
 152. See ZHU SULI, NATIVE RESOURCES, supra note 18, at 60; Fan Zhongxin, supra note 149. 
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B. The Communitarian Rule of Law Principle 
Professor Gao Hongjun, who teaches at Tsinghua University in 
Beijing, can best be placed at the liberal end of the scholarly avant-garde 
spectrum. Gao’s theoretical ambitions mark him as an avant-garde scholar, 
but he does not promote himself as an intellectual revolutionary or a “post-
modernist.”153 While Gao’s works are widely cited, from Party journals to 
academic law reviews, he has not assumed as prominent a role in Chinese 
legal academia as Zhu Suli, He Weifang, and Xia Yong.154 Nonetheless, 
Gao is one of the few Chinese legal scholars who is interested in 
examining alternatives to the mainstream and liberal rule of law 
principles.155 Gao has also taken up the challenge of explicitly formulating 
a “communitarian rule of law” (gongtongti fazhi) principle, which sets him 
apart from most avant-garde scholars in China and in the West.156 
Gao begins his book The Emergence of the Modern Rule of Law by 
lamenting at the fact that Chinese legal thought has become resentful of 
grand theory and, thus, lost the view of the overall direction of Chinese 
law.157 In contrast to this trend, Gao sets out to renew the rule of law 
principle at the highest level of abstraction. Gao describes the rule of law 
in Weberian terms as a product of increasing rationalization and 
secularization.158 Like the vast majority of Chinese scholars, Gao believes 
in the progressive nature of these processes. At the same time, Gao does 
not subscribe to an uncritically positive view of the rule of law principle. 
Gao believes that the same social forces that brought about the rule of law 
also had negative effects on society.159 He argues that the modern rule of 
law ideology reflects a form of “efficiency fetishism.”160 Elements of the 
rule of law, such as formal equality and legal regulation, increase 
 
 
 153. Stylistically, however, Gao does not fall squarely within the mainstream legal tradition either. 
See, e.g., Gao Hongjun, Yuyan Yu Yuyan: Tian. De. Ren [Fables and Prophecies: Heaven. Earth. 
Man], QINGHUA FAZHI LUNHENG [TSINGHUA J.  RULE L.] 7 (Jan. 2010).  
 154. According to China Academic Journals Database, as of January 27, 2012, there were nearly 
1300 articles referring to both Gao Hongjun and the rule of law (法治) as well as 50 references to 
Gao’s book The Emergence of the Modern Rule of Law.  
 155. Gao has conducted theoretically ambitious comparative law research on American and 
Islamic law. See Gao Hongjun, Meiguo Falü Wenhua de Ziyou Ji Qi Juxian [Freedom and Its Limits in 
the American Legal Culture], QINGHUA FAXUE [TSINGHUA L.] 87 (Jan. 2009); Chongtu Yu Jueze: 
Yisilan Shijie Falü Xiandaihua [Conflict and Choice: The Islamic World and the Modernization of 
Law], BIJIAO FA YANJIU [J. COMP. L.] 1 (Apr. 2001). 
 156. See GAO HONGJUN, supra note 13, at 7. 
 157. Id. at 4. 
 158. Id. at 2.  
 159. Id. at 264–72. 
 160. Id. at 287. 
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economic efficiency.161 However, at the same time, these elements have 
“incited a boundless desire for consumption, led to environmental 
degradation, exacerbated the meaning of internal life, implicitly increased 
wealth differences, and caused vulnerable groups to be neglected.”162 Gao 
concedes that the rule of law has provided protection against authoritarian 
rule, but he also argues that it has removed the traditional barriers against 
egoism.163 Like the above-mentioned critical avant-garde scholars, Gao 
believes that the atomistic “individualism” of the rule of law ideology has 
led to the neglect of communal values.164 In particular, he argues that the 
conception of individual human rights and property rights have obstructed 
non-utilitarian interpersonal exchanges and cooperation.165 Gao describes 
the consequences of such individualism through four-character phrases, 
which can be translated as follows: “loneliness without companion; 
isolation without support; lonesome suffering without assistance; solitude 
without help.”166 
To solve these problems, Gao embarks on an ambitious effort to 
“analyze and integrate the basic values, structures and relations of modern 
society.”167 He presents a far-reaching social program, which ultimately 
leads to the “communitarian rule of law.”168 Gao’s program is centered on 
strengthening non-utilitarian social relations that are based on shared 
beliefs, affections, and interests.169 Gao advocates the establishment of 
autonomous communities, which are based on voluntary and open 
membership, mutual cooperation, equal status between the members, 
participatory decision making, and the possibility to criticize all 
decisions.170 Voluntary communities are needed, according to Gao, at all 
levels of human interaction from environmental organizations to 
international organizations.171 Gao admits that in the past large voluntary 
communities have not been able to eradicate hierarchies between their 
members or avoid bureaucratization.172 However, he believes that the 
advancements in information technology will solve these problems and 
 
 
 161. Id. at 285–86. 
 162. Id. at 288–89. 
 163. Id. at 292. 
 164. Id. at 293. 
 165. Id.  
 166. Id. at 292. 
 167. Id. at 284. 
 168. Id. at 315. 
 169. Id. at 307–08. 
 170. Id. at 309. 
 171. Id. at 310. 
 172. Id. at 319–20. 
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make it possible to establish “voluntary associations, in which oppositions 
between rulers and subjects, and orders and obedience will no longer 
exist.”173 Ideally, these voluntary organizations will take the form of 
economic units, and enable their members to earn their living while 
pursuing an interest or a hobby.174 Failing this, a social security system 
should be established to provide basic living conditions for everybody and 
to free people from utilitarian necessities.175 Gao believes that efficiency 
gains will ultimately enable those members of society who actually have 
to produce goods to spend more time in non-utilitarian activities.176 
In the voluntary communities envisioned by Gao, each member is both 
a legislator and a rule follower.177 Members discuss rules openly, and, if 
they cannot reach compromise about them, always have the option to walk 
away from the community.178 Disputes between members of the 
communities are solved primarily through mediation, negotiation, and 
arbitration.179 For disputes that cannot be solved through voluntary means, 
there will exist state-run judicial institutions.180 Gao acknowledges that the 
multiplication of voluntary communities leads to increasing pluralism and 
increasing conflicts between such communities. Under the communitarian 
approach such conflicts are resolved not through adjudication but “through 
discussions and demonstrations between the voluntary communities and 
the communities and the State, which will lead to a consensus or at least a 
reasonable compromise.”181 The communitarian rule of law does not, 
according to Gao, seek absolute certainty of formal law, but “situational 
certainty,” embodying the “grammar of everyday life.”182 In these 
voluntary communities, “rules are no longer marked by a high degree of 
technical ‛jargon’ but reflect the words in which the communities’ 
members understand their own lives.”183 Gao makes use of Confucius’s 
Analects to argue that in this communitarian utopia people and 
communities are “harmonious but different” (he er butong).184  
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 174. Id. at 312. 
 175. Id. at 314–15. 
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 179. Id. at 316. 
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Gao presents this vision as highly speculative. Gao argues that the 
efficiency fetish and atomistic individualism can be remedied only by 
breaking away from the slavery of money, which he acknowledges is not a 
realistic prospect.185 Gao also admits that the feasibility of the 
communitarian model rests on technological improvements, which enable 
people to abstain from utilitarian pursuits.186 Gao finally asserts that it 
would be “obviously unrealistic to abandon the rule of law in favor of 
other governance models.”187 Like other avant-garde projects, Gao’s 
communitarian rule of law turns out to be a distant vision. 
For scholars who do not share Gao’s communitarian sensibilities, his 
rule of law model offers ample fodder for critique. From the critical avant-
garde perspective, Gao’s vision of an ideal community member—a 
legislator and a rule follower who enjoys equal status with all the other 
members of the community—seems as unrealistic a description of human 
nature as the “liberal self” that the communitarians criticize. For the 
liberals, it is hard to see how the voluntariness of the communities and the 
freedom of movement between them can be guaranteed without an 
extensive system of liberal civil rights. If the communities are truly 
voluntary, it should be possible to establish political parties that advocate, 
for instance, transition to a liberal democracy or conservative fiscal 
policies based on private ownership. A liberal can also argue that the need 
to mediate between the plurality of political viewpoints, communal values, 
religious freedoms, and financial interests brings Gao’s communitarianism 
back to the starting point of political liberalism. For the liberal, the 
discovery of the non-liberal “self,” outlined by Professor Gao, cannot be 
obtained without the abstract rights of the liberal rule of law ideology. 
Indeed, the concrete solutions promoted by Gao Hongjun are distinctively 
liberal. Gao laments the fact that the Chinese judiciary lacks independence 
and that it cannot limit the powers of the National People’s Congress 
(NPC), let alone the government,188 and advocates “truly free and open 
elections of [NPC] delegates.”189  
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VI. ANALYSIS 
A. Taking Stock of Avant-Garde Proposals 
Given their ambitious goals, the actual claims made by the above-
described Chinese avant-garde scholars about a desirable non-liberal 
governance ideology and concrete legal institutions are strikingly modest. 
This is most obviously the case with the critical strand of avant-garde 
scholarship. Professor Deng Zhenglai, who set out to look for an “ideal 
image of Chinese law” in Whither Chinese Law, not only did not present 
such an image, but ended up stating that the quest for it reflected an 
“essentialist tendency” which he opposed.190 Professor Deng framed his 
critique as only the beginning of a long process of research and 
reflection.191 Similarly, Professor Wang Hui’s far-reaching critique of 
modernity turns out to be only “a point of departure for discussion.”192 
Wang acknowledges that “the critiques of modernity . . . are one of the 
most important characteristics of Chinese modernity.”193 Moreover, 
despite Professor Cui Zhiyuan’s explicit wish to “liberate” mankind, he 
almost mockingly praises “petty bourgeois socialism.” Cui supports 
China’s current system of land ownership, shareholding cooperatives, and 
the trading of shares of the state-owned enterprises on the stock 
exchange.194 
The ideological and institutional proposals of Xia Yong and Gao 
Hongjun are more visionary, but they also fall short of articulating a 
workable alternative to the liberal rule of law principle. Gao Hongjun sets 
out to advance communitarian values instead of liberal “individualism,” 
but he ends up reaffirming individual autonomy and freedom in a way that 
arguably necessitates the very structures of political liberalism that he 
criticizes. Gao’s proposal is premised on liberal institutions such as the 
freedoms of speech, association, and political participation, and he 
envisions the judicial resolution of disputes as the ultimate remedy for 
dispute resolution.195 Gao, it appears, is either too realistic or too 
committed to liberal values to abandon them in favor of more radical 
solutions, which he initially sets out to provide.196 
 
 
 190. See DENG, WHITHER CHINESE LAW, supra note 1, at 9, 261. 
 191. Id. at 260. 
 192. See WANG HUI, supra note 29, at 66. 
 193. Id. at 66, 79. 
 194. See Cui Zhiyuan, supra note 12, at 157. 
 195. See GAO HONGJUN, supra note 13, at 309–10, 316. 
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Xia Yong, on the other hand, makes far-reaching statements about the 
relevance of pre-Qin dynasty concepts to contemporary China, but it is 
questionable whether these statements are meaningful in contemporary 
China and, to the extent they are, whether they are politically desirable.197 
Moreover, Xia is too sophisticated and nuanced a scholar to discard the 
liberal rule of law principle. Xia is hostile toward liberal political thought, 
but sees the rule of law, human rights, and “democracy” (but perhaps not 
“multiparty democracy”) as necessary first steps for China’s 
developmental process.198 Indeed, many New Confucian scholars 
acknowledge the central role of liberal political thought in contemporary 
societies. For instance, Professor Tu Weiming, the already mentioned New 
Confucian scholar, acknowledges that the “possibility of a radically 
different ethic or a new value system . . . is neither realistic nor 
authentic.”199 Tu explains the New Confucians’ close proximity to 
liberalism as a necessary part of a learning process. Like the traditional 
Chinese character for the “sage” (聖), which “consists of both ear and 
mouth radicals,” Confucian sage’s “wisdom is nurtured by the art of 
listening and expressed through verbal communication.”200 Also in Xia 
Yong’s scholarship New Confucianism turns out to be a distant, and at 
present loosely articulated, goal, rather than something that exists today as 
a concrete alternative to the liberal rule of law ideology. 
B. Ideological Repression and Avant-Garde Scholarship 
The apparent failure of the above-described avant-garde scholarship to 
come up with credible alternatives to the liberal rule of law ideology is 
probably due to reasons more fundamental than China’s autocratic state. 
Tu Weiming, for instance, moved to Taiwan at an early age and made his 
career as a tenured professor in the United States. He has thus most likely 
been impervious to the influence of Chinese politics.201 This suggests that 
the imagination of avant-garde scholars is limited by something other than 
 
 
the 1970s. See Victor H. Li, The Role of Law in Communist China, 44 CHINA Q. 66, 73–74 (1970). 
 197. Id. at 127. 
 198. See Xia Yong, supra note 126, at 65; XIA YONG, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 13, at 9. 
 199. See Tu Weiming, Beyond the Enlightenment Mentality, in CONFUCIANISM AND ECOLOGY: 
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& CONFLICT STUD. 1, 8 (2009).  
 201. For biographical information regarding Tu Wei-ming, see TU WEIMING & DAISAKU IKEDA, 
NEW HORIZONS IN EASTERN HUMANISM: BUDDHISM, CONFUCIANISM AND THE QUEST FOR GLOBAL 
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Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
116 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 13:83 
 
 
 
 
crude political force. In any event, it is difficult to ascertain what counts as 
“political influence” in contemporary Chinese legal academia. The 
existence of political influence itself is a taboo in China, and there are few 
first-hand textual accounts of it.202 Chinese academics are reportedly 
pressured politically and sometimes forced out of office for political 
reasons.203 When present, political influence most likely takes the form of 
self-censorship rather than overt coercion. As a consequence, it is difficult 
for an outsider to tell when the opinion of an individual scholar is sincere 
and when it is the result of self-censorship. This is, for instance, the case 
with statements by Chinese legal scholars about China’s democratic 
reforms. Vague formulations about democratic reforms may be carefully 
balanced attempts to nudge the reform process toward a multiparty 
democracy, but they may also reflect genuinely held ambivalent attitudes 
about China’s optimal development strategies.204 Moreover, it is most 
likely naive to assume that there is a single knowable intention behind 
avant-garde legal theory or any other complex text. At some point in the 
future, Chinese law professors may well be tempted to reassess the 
sincerity of their present scholarly work. Today’s ambivalent legal 
scholarship will offer ample opportunity for such re-characterizations. 
Nonetheless, it also seems possible to conclude that the autocratic 
nature of China’s political system has discouraged scholars from freely 
engaging in path-breaking ideological debates. The most visible symptoms 
of political repression in Chinese legal academia are political taboo 
concepts and euphemisms that circumvent these taboos. The concept of 
“constitutional democracy” (xianzheng minzhu), for instance, is widely 
understood as a euphemism for multiparty democracy, a politically 
 
 
 202. For some suggestive references, see LIANG ZHIPING, ZAI BIANYUAN WAI SIKAO [THINKING 
OUTSIDE THE MARGINS] 260 (2009); GAO HONGJUN, supra note 13, at 4.  For space to dissent within 
Chinese public discourse, see Gloria Davies, Homo Dissensum Significans, or The Perils of Taking a 
Stand in China 29 SOC. TEXT 29 (2012). 
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Topics in University Classrooms, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (May 20, 2013), http://chronicle.com/article 
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activities-in-japan.html?_r=0; Chris Buckley, Outspoken Chinese Professor Says He Was Dismissed, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/20/world/asia/xia-yeliang-an-outspoken 
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 204. See Xin Chunying, supra note 33, at 89 (arguing that in order to implement the will of the 
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sensitive concept.205 The phrase “constitutional democracy” is sufficiently 
vague to allow plausible deniability for the promoters of multiparty 
democracy, even if the liberal implications of the phrase are commonly 
known.206 Similarly, today “judicial independence” (sifa duli) is a risqué 
concept marking the division of powers between the state and the 
judiciary, whereas the “independence of adjudication” (shenpan duli) is a 
safer way to talk about judicial independence.207 Political taboos have 
presumably deterred some scholars from entering ideological debates and 
made it more difficult for scholars already in that field to discuss 
alternatives to liberal and socialist political thought. Ironically, the state’s 
ideological repression has made it more difficult for Chinese scholars to 
articulate credible alternatives to the liberal rule of law ideology. 
However, even if ideological repression may have affected Chinese 
legal scholarship on a general level, its influence on anti-liberal avant-
garde scholarship has been less obvious. Avant-garde scholars do not 
promote liberal political institutions unequivocally, and hence have less 
use for euphemistic terms that are normally telltale signs of politically 
sensitive ideas. As outspoken critics of conventional socialism, avant-
garde scholars also see no need to reproduce political slogans such as “the 
socialist rule of law conception.” The fact that Chinese avant-garde 
scholarship has been produced under politically repressive conditions can 
be inferred, if at all, from double standards that at times seem to affect the 
avant-garde texts. For instance, Professor Wang Hui’s social critique loses 
much of its sharpness when he discusses the Communist Party. Wang is 
concerned about the Party’s ability to keep itself distinct from “the interest 
of market society.”208 The disconnect between the Party and the economy, 
according to Wang, has helped the Party to “express the will of society 
 
 
 205. See Feng Chongyi, The Chinese Liberal Camp in Post-4 June China, in THE IMPACT OF 
CHINA’S 1989 TIANANMEN MASSACRE 66, 81 n.2 (Jean Philippe Béja ed., 2011). 
 206. Id. The concept “constitutional democracy” (xianzheng minzhu) does not appear in the 2004 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences compilation on the rule of law articles cited supra note 32, nor 
does the CCP refer to it in its textbook on the socialist rule of law principle. See THE SOCIALIST RULE 
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concept in an op-ed piece. See He Weifang, Minzhu Xianzheng Chuangzao Heping Yu Fanrong 
[Constitutional Democracy Brings About Peace and Prosperity], CAIJING (Jan. 30, 2013), http://blog. 
caijing.com.cn/expert_article-151302-14405.shtml. 
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?ArticleID=35129. 
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with relative independence and ‘neutrality.’”209 Although Wang places the 
word “neutrality” within quotation marks, the notion that a political 
organization could be a neutral outlet of the “people’s will” is not in line 
with Wang’s otherwise sophisticated scholarship, which seeks to question 
claims to neutrality.210 If one accepts the absence of evidence as evidence 
of absence, similar double standards can be seen to affect many avant-
garde texts. Deng Zhenglai’s and Cui Zhiyuan’s critique of essentialism 
and the modernization paradigm would seem to call to question the very 
raison d’être of the Chinese Communist Party, whereas New Confucian 
and communitarian scholarship would benefit from a frank analysis of the 
Party’s role in the destruction of the values promoted in these strands of 
scholarship. 
C. Paradoxes of Ideological Renewal 
Despite the fact that ideological debates are politically sensitive in 
China, being associated with avant-garde scholarship has certain upsides 
for Chinese scholars. Avant-garde scholars not only get a shot at historical 
prominence as potential reformers of Chinese legal and political thought, 
but they can also benefit from near instant fame in today’s academia. 
Ideological alternatives to liberalism and “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics” are so rare in China that, to use a Chinese saying, scholars 
“flock to them like ducks” (qu zhi ruo wu). For instance, a proposal for a 
“consultative rule of law regime” by Professor Pan Wei has generated a 
wealth of commentary in China and elsewhere.211 The works of Xia Yong, 
Cui Zhiyuan, and Deng Zhenglai have been widely commented on in 
China and also noted internationally.212 However, the price for their 
audacity to imagine new ideological alternatives can be steep. As one 
Western critic of liberalism characterized the problem: “I don’t see myself 
in the business of designing an alternative social order. People who do that 
 
 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at xxiii–xxiv.  
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always end up making fools of themselves.”213 Avant-garde scholarship is 
a balancing act between dreaming up ideological and institutional visions 
and trying not to stray too far from what seems possible. The result of this 
practice is the kind of tentative and self-reflective scholarship that this 
article has described.  
Avant-garde scholars hope, of course, that their efforts generate 
ideological hybrids that will one day consolidate into true alternatives to 
the liberal rule of law ideology.214 Some avant-garde projects may have 
already been politically effective. Xia Yong’s texts have possibly 
contributed to the New Confucian themes that emerged in China’s official 
state ideology during the 2000s. Today the Party teaches its law 
enforcement officials to lead through example and persuasion, rather than 
through strict law enforcement alone.215 It is also true that neo-
conservative legal thought has become an intellectual force on Chinese 
law school campuses. Yet at the same time, avant-garde scholarship itself 
provides analytical tools that render its project dubious.216 In addition to 
the “false necessities” arguments, which seek to demonstrate that 
ideological boundaries are illusory,217 avant-garde scholarship suggests 
that the modest nature of institutional and ideological arguments of avant-
garde scholars is a reflection of hidden and repressed social forces that 
may ultimately frustrate the avant-garde scholars’ attempts. 
Professor Wang Hui provides once more a means for demonstrating 
this point. As noted above, Wang makes a number of “false necessity” 
arguments about legal and political institutions. Wang, for instance, calls 
for “the liberation of the value of freedom itself from its imprisonment in a 
monolingual understanding of economic relations, and for placing this 
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concept in a broader framework of understanding.”218 Wang argues that 
“freedom” should not be perceived merely in terms of capitalist negative 
rights—such as the right to contract labor—nor as an end in its own right, 
but in its developmental and social context.219 Wang suggests that “the 
contract form of labor” has contributed to the “emergence of slave labor” 
in China’s coastal regions.220 In this respect, contract freedom is “one of 
today’s many pressing social problems.”221  
Wang is not satisfied with Western notions of democracy either, but 
wishes “to make democracy something more than an empty form, into 
something with substantive meaning.”222 In summary, Wang suggests that 
the Western-style democracy promoted by Chinese liberals is a false 
necessity, and that there are better ways to facilitate people’s democratic 
participation.223 In addition to such false necessity arguments, Wang 
makes use of the notion that concealed forces direct the Chinese 
ideological imagination of Chinese scholars. One of Wang’s principal 
claims is that a process of “depoliticization” has rendered Western, and in 
particular American, institutions natural and uncontestable in China.224 
Wang extends this point to the processes of “modernization,” which builds 
on the dichotomy between science and tradition, “the market principle,” 
“individual rights system,” and so forth.225  
From Wang’s perspective, then, it is a small step to see denied or 
repressed social forces behind critical avant-garde scholars’ own 
institutional imagination. This would explain, for instance, why Wang’s 
views on civil and political rights appear so conventional in the Chinese 
context. Wang states that,  
[I]n light of the extremely complex contemporary social situation, 
the struggle for freedom of speech and of the press must be located 
within the historical horizon of broader democratic demands, from 
which would arise a much tighter connection between the demands 
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 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. at xxx. 
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for constitutional rights and demands by other social strata and 
social movements.226  
These demands are, according to Wang, those of the “worker and peasant 
classes.” Wang notes that those intellectuals who discuss constitutional 
rights, such as the freedom of thought, speech, and assembly, “have not 
been able to connect these pursuits with those of other social strata, 
namely the struggle for survival and the right to development.”227 Here 
Wang is either making a good faith plea for an entirely new political 
institution (and a philosophy supporting it) of which there are few traces in 
his scholarship, or he is reproducing the conservative socialist argument, 
according to which civil and political rights are secondary to “people’s 
right to subsistence and development.”228 
The suspicion that repressed social forces influence critical avant-garde 
scholarship is strengthened by the similarities between the critical avant-
garde sensibility and the sensibilities of Western critical theory. With 
some creative license, it is possible to see the Chinese avant-garde 
scholars as specimens of the inward looking “aesthete,” which MacIntyre 
identified as one of the caricatures of Western ethical life. MacIntyre 
described the “aesthete” as a person who was most interested in his or her 
own immediate aesthetic experience rather than any managerial issue or 
cosmopolitan universalism.229 From this perspective, the ironic detachment 
of the Chinese post-modern critical scholar may be no less a cultural 
import as the social engineer and the Leninist revolutionary before him. 
Similarly, the path-breaking aspects of Xia Yong’s work may be 
obvious to a sympathetic reader who is willing to interpret them against 
some new syntax. Yet to a skeptical (liberal or conservative) reader, Xia’s 
project takes a liberal turn when he justifies civil rights on the basis of 
traditional Confucian values, and a more conservative one when he wishes 
to limit such rights in favor of the “Great Harmony.” Again, Xia himself 
provides the intellectual means to arrive at both these interpretations. As 
already mentioned, Xia sees morality as part of the “grammar” of society: 
concepts that diverge from this morality are like “books made of words 
and phrases without grammar or syntax.”230 The question is whether the 
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concepts provided by Xia belong to, or are able to give rise to, a new 
living grammar.231 A skeptical reader would argue that Xia’s New 
Confucian concepts are no less ungrammatical in the eyes of modern-day 
Chinese audiences than the conceptions of Western morality that have 
supposedly caused China’s present crisis of morality.232 
Regardless of the Chinese avant-garde scholars’ efforts at “systemic 
and theoretical innovation,”233 their scholarship may also have the actual 
effect of reinforcing the ideological status quo. In some ways this is the 
express aim of the avant-garde scholars. As discussed above, Cui Zhiyuan 
and Wang Hui explicitly support China’s existing political and legal 
institutions from one-party rule to the communal ownership of agricultural 
land. Yet even when avant-garde scholars genuinely attempt to articulate 
new ideological and institutional conceptions, the argument remains that 
these innovations are misunderstood and misconstrued by their audience—
to use a term of critical theory, “[t]he language speaks the speaker.”234 
Therefore, even if Wang’s above-mentioned position on constitutional 
rights truly aims to “build a [new kind of] participatory economic and 
political framework,”235 Chinese audiences may construe it as an apology 
for the repression of civil and political rights. From this perspective, the 
avant-garde promise of theoretical innovation appears as window-dressing 
for maintaining the political status quo. In addition, even when the 
ideological and institutional proposals of avant-garde scholars are truly 
radical, their contemporaries have arguably no means of recognizing and 
appreciating them. Visions of the “Great Harmony” that unites humanity 
with nature and the cosmos, and of self-sufficient, democratic 
communities, may simply be too tentative to be taken seriously by the 
majority of Chinese intellectuals. A focus on repressed social forces leads 
to the conclusion that reform-minded scholars can only hope to create 
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illusions of limitless possibilities; these possibilities cannot be articulated 
in words lest they be dismissed as unrealistic. This would explain the 
nostalgic nature of much avant-garde scholarship. If nothing else, extinct 
social institutions provide concrete examples of alternatives to 
contemporary liberal legal institutions. 
Yet, to make the argument truly circular, nothing prevents the Chinese 
avant-garde scholars from employing the false necessities argument 
against the analysis above. Avant-garde scholarship allows for the 
argument that a sympathetic audience will find a way to make the 
ideological sprouts that avant-garde texts provide into a flourishing social 
practice. Why this has not yet occurred may be due to the personal 
shortcomings of individual legal scholars, whose ideological arguments 
have not been sufficiently plausible, and the timidity of their audiences. It 
is difficult to quantify the social effects of this argument, but given the 
alarm with which liberal Chinese scholars have treated avant-garde 
scholarship, the vision of limitless possibilities painted by Chinese avant-
garde scholarship is tempting to a number of Chinese intellectuals. Still, 
and in contrast to Marxist, liberal, and developmentalist certainties, avant-
garde scholarship offers no guarantees for such ideological renewal. From 
the perspective of avant-garde scholars, ideological change is both enabled 
and obstructed by contemporary ideological structures, whose 
beneficiaries and prisoners avant-garde scholars themselves are. To put 
this in another way, seeing ideological development as a paradoxical 
project is an inherent element of the avant-garde project.236 The position of 
the avant-garde scholars is to step back and make the paradoxes of 
liberalism, modernity, and their own scholarship explicit, hoping that this 
posture will eventually bring about positive ideological change. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
It has proved far more difficult for Chinese avant-garde scholars to 
articulate credible “contextual” alternatives to the liberal rule of law 
ideology than what the development common sense would suggest. It is 
possible, of course, to come up with examples of non-liberal institutional 
practices, such as the repressive hukou system. However, Chinese avant-
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garde scholars examined in this Article find it difficult to describe such 
institutions as ideologically desirable. Consequently, these scholars do not 
hope to discard liberal legal thought, but on the contrary believe that 
making a clear break with it would be unrealistic. In the absence of a 
plausible ideological alternative, these scholars are left with an anti-
managerial worldview that praises the paradoxical and resists declaring its 
core beliefs. This may be a necessary strategy when any definite statement 
of the elements of a new avant-garde ideology seems implausible or 
undesirable, but it also risks rendering avant-garde scholarship an 
ineffective academic discourse or even an apology for the political status 
quo. As Chinese avant-garde scholarship itself teaches, the assumption 
that there is no single, universally valid ideological blueprint for economic 
and social development needs, therefore, to be qualified with the 
recognition of contextual political and ideological conflicts and the 
preeminence of hegemonic ideological structures. 
It is also clear that Chinese avant-garde scholarship is conducted on the 
strength of, rather than in spite of, global legal thought and social theory. 
Indeed, much of the appeal of Chinese avant-garde scholarship may be due 
to its claim that it represents the latest, most up-to-date phase of social 
theory and legal thought. It is no surprise, then, that Chinese avant-garde 
scholarship shares with American and European critical theory not only its 
dislike for the ideological status quo but also a sense of helplessness. 
Ironically, the same tradition of social theory that keeps the promise of 
ideological renewal hanging in front of the Chinese avant-garde scholars 
also convinces these scholars of their powerlessness in face of the liberal 
hegemony, thus reconstituting the cycle of hope and disillusionment from 
one research project to another. Again, this goes to demonstrate how 
deeply embedded the avant-garde critics of hegemonic ideological 
structures are in the object of their critique—a point that is not lost to the 
self-reflective Chinese avant-garde scholars. 
Finally, it must be recognized that the avant-garde scholars’ academic 
interventions have already been successful to a certain extent. Although 
political taboos and anti-managerialist inertia have prevented some avant-
garde scholars from promoting concrete institutional models, their more 
elusive project to discredit the liberal rule of law model has been effective. 
Chinese university campuses teem with young intellectuals who view the 
liberal rule of law ideology with skepticism. These young scholars and 
students may not have a precise alternative in mind, but they find solace in 
avant-garde scholarship, which teaches that nailing down the meaning of 
ideological conceptions is “essentialist” and hence pointless. For the 
followers of avant-garde scholarship it is only understandable that they are 
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unwilling to give up the goods of the liberal rule of law ideology: 
ideological development is a paradoxical process, after all. The avant-
garde scene provides, therefore, not only a sufficiently inconsequential 
forum for political radicalism, but also an aesthetically pleasing 
explanation for conflicting emotions about China and the West—and, 
possibly, a chance to be part of something truly new. 
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